

# Interlinkages between Internal and International Migration and Development in the Asian Region

Ronald Skeldon\*

*Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ, UK*

## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the linkages between systems of internal migration and systems of international migration in the Asian region. In the context of changing global patterns of international migration on the one hand and urbanisation on the other, the paper briefly examines the evolution of two different traditions in migration research and policy: those concerned with international and those concerned with internal migration.

Recognising that there is some blurring in any distinction between the two types of migration, the paper hypothesises that there are sufficient differences between the two systems to warrant separate identification. Although both can operate simultaneously, the paper goes on to posit two scenarios: that internal migration can lead to international migration; and that international migration can lead to internal migration. Evidence from various parts of South and East Asia is employed to examine the validity of these statements.

There is no single evolutionary path, and examples of both scenarios are found in Asia. The concentration of populations in urban areas can give rise to later international movements, but these international migrations themselves, by creating vacuums in areas of origin, can in turn generate internal migration. The history of colonial contact, too, can initiate international migration from particular areas, not necessarily just urban, which give

rise to later internal movements. Internal and international migrations are integrated and it is necessary to consider them as a unified system rather than in isolation. The hierarchical movements link richer and poorer groups together and need to be understood in the context of the implementation of programmes of poverty alleviation. By attempting to link internal and international migration, this paper is a small step towards the creation of a more integrated framework for the study of population movement.

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## CONTEXT: CHANGING AND INCREASING MIGRATIONS

The global system of migration has been transformed over the last 100 years. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Europe was the principal source of international migration: westwards towards the Americas but also eastwards into Siberia and Central Asia. There were other flows, from the United Kingdom to Australasia and from southern China into Southeast Asia, for example, but the global system can be said to have been dominated by movements across the Atlantic. A century later, and again at the risk of over-generalisation, international migrations across the Pacific from Asia to North America and

\*Correspondence to: Ronald Skeldon, Department of Geography, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SJ, UK.  
E-mail: R.Skeldon@sussex.ac.uk

Australasia and from Latin America to North America have come to dominate the global system. Europe, rather than being an origin of migration, has now emerged as a destination of migrants from Africa, Asia and the Americas. Within Asia, significant destinations have emerged among the most developed economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia, as well as the oil-rich countries of West Asia.

Underlying these broad shifts in the global migration system has been one of the great transformations in human society: the transition from rural to urban, in which migration has played a fundamental part. In 1850, the proportion of the present developed world that was classified as urban was estimated at around 16% (Bairoch, 1988: 221). By 1900, this proportion had reached almost 30% while the proportion of urban population of the developing world remained at 9.1% (Bairoch, 1988: 290, 428). In terms of absolute numbers, in 1900, it was estimated that some 163 million people lived in the towns and cities of the developed world, while those living in urban areas in the developing world numbered about 99 million. By 1950, the proportion of the population of the developed world that was urban was calculated at 52.5%, while the equivalent figure for the developing world was 17.9% (United Nations, 2004). By the year 2000, these proportions had risen to 73.9% and 40.5% respectively, with some 882 million people in the developed world and 1,974 million people in the developing world living in urban areas. This 20-fold increase, within a century, in the number of people living in the urban areas of the developing world is one of the momentous changes of our time.

The contribution that migration has made to this transformation is difficult to estimate. One of the major problems is the separation of the impact of the reclassification of rural populations to urban, a shift that involves a simple change in status of a population *in situ*, from the impact of those who actually move physically from rural to urban sectors. Because of the methodological difficulties of such a separation, migration and reclassification are normally considered together. For the decades of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the net annual contribution of migration and reclassification from the rural to the urban sector in the developing world has been estimated at 4.6, 9.3

and 13.9 million respectively (United Nations, 2001: 35). The proportion of urban growth in the developing world that was brought about by net migration increased from about 40% in the 1960s to around 55% in the 1980s, with the balance due to the natural increase of the urban population. Considerable variation from region to region and country to country exists. The net figures clearly do not represent the actual number of rural-to-urban migrants but simply the balance between the numbers of those moving into towns against those moving out. It is also well recognised that much of the migration in the developing world is circular, involving complex systems of movement to and from urban centres that are often not captured by standard data-gathering instruments (Hugo, 1983, 1996; Prothero and Chapman, 1985; Chapman and Prothero, 1985; Standing, 1985; Skeldon, 1990). Hence, the number of actual movers between the two sectors was many times more than these numbers might suggest. There were also very significant flows within both the rural and the urban sectors themselves during the decades in question.

In terms of international migration, the stock of people outside their country of birth in the year 2000 was estimated at around 175 million or 3% of the world's population (United Nations, 2002). This figure had more than doubled since 1970, while the world's population had increased by 64%. The same source estimated that the annual average net migration from developing to developed countries during the 1990s was 2.4 million, or some 25 million over the decade. Again, these figures represent net migration, and the real numbers of migrants were greater than the numbers imply. Nevertheless, the readily available data do clearly show the increasing importance of population movements both internal to countries and from one country to another. What is not clear, however, is the nature of any relationship between the increasing internal movements and the increasing international migrations.

## TWO MIGRATION TRADITIONS

Part of the reason for the lack of clarity in the understanding of any relationship between internal and international migrations is that those studying the movements come from different backgrounds and traditions. Perhaps even more

critically, the data sources used to measure the two migrations are different and, in turn, require the application of different analytical techniques, differences that have already been well recognised (Salt and Kitching, 1992). As important, however, have been the changing ways in which researchers have considered migration. These have been dictated partly by real trends within the global migration system and partly by fashion. Just as the global migration system has changed over time, so too have the ways in which we have looked at those changes. In the 1960s and early 1970s, attention was directed primarily at internal migration and urbanisation, with the relationship of migration towards urban areas in the face of rising urban unemployment being a central concern. The results of this research were perhaps most clearly shown in the seminal work of Todaro (1969) but also, and from different perspectives, in work coordinated through the World Employment Programme of the International Labour Organization (Standing, 1985; Bilsborrow *et al.*, 1984) and the series of studies carried out by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) entitled *Comparative Study on Migration, Urbanization and Development* (ESCAP, 1980–84). At that time, international migration (excluding refugee flows) was, with notable exceptions in a few northern European countries, not a major policy issue.

Since the 1980s, however, attention has increasingly been drawn towards movements across international borders. The changes to immigration laws in the major settler societies from the 1960s were fundamental to this change. So, too, were the declines in fertility in Europe that saw very low growth rates of labour forces, decreasing pressures for emigration and increasing pressures for immigration. The traditional societies had to look elsewhere for immigrants if they wished to maintain their immigrant traditions. These factors helped to usher in a very different world in which non-European migrants began to move to areas that had been dominated by Europeans. The emergence of more obviously multicultural societies in the developed world drew the attention of researchers into migration, almost to the exclusion of the internal movements of people. The key references of this period reflect this perspective. The landmark *Cambridge Survey of World Migration* (Cohen, 1995) deliber-

ately excluded any consideration of internal migration, and Castles and Miller's *Age of Migration* (1998) is an age of international migration just as Weiner's *The Global Migration Crisis* (1995) is a crisis in international migration. Sowell's *Migrations and Cultures* (1996), Brettell and Hollifield's *Migration Theory* (2000) and the International Organization for Migration's *World Migration Report* (IOM, 2000, 2003) are all concerned with movements across international borders. The word 'migration' has come to mean 'international migration' (even if, more recently, the word 'migration' itself is being displaced by 'diaspora'), with internal migration being subsumed under 'population distribution' (United Nations, 1998). Yet, the fundamental fact remains: the vast majority of people who migrate in the world today do so within the borders of their country of birth.

The association of migration with international population movements is not new, as Taft's *Human Migration* (1936) in the US and Gregory's *Human Migration and the Future* (1928) in the UK clearly illustrate. Nevertheless, the father of modern migration studies, Ernst Ravenstein, derived his famous 'laws of migration' (1885, 1889) from studies of internal movements, and important early works such as Redford's *Labour Migration in England 1800–1850* (1926) focused only on internal migration. This is not the place to develop a historiography of migration, but it is pertinent here to emphasise that two clear traditions have evolved around the concept of migration, each with their own data sources, methodologies and particular research questions and agendas. Those working on international migration seldom consider internal migration to be relevant to their interests, and vice versa. One rare attempt to examine the applicability of theories developed for internal migration to international migration, and vice versa, was by Pryor (1981), although he did not try to see how the two systems themselves might be linked. Yet, it would seem intuitively obvious that there may be some kind of relationship between the two, and the differences between them may not be quite as clear as at first might appear. Internal migration may give rise to international migration and vice versa.

Of the few attempts to link the two types of migration, two are particularly worthy of note. The first is contained in a seminal examination of

migration across the Atlantic that associated the migration in and from England in the nineteenth century with alternating building cycles in Britain and North America (Thomas, 1954). When the cycle in Britain was in the ascendancy and that in America in decline, domestic rural-to-urban migration within Britain was dominant, and when the cycles were reversed international movements from Britain to America were dominant. Thus, internal and international migrations were alternative strategies depending upon the relative stages of long economic cycles in various parts of a regional system. However, Thomas hypothesised rural-to-urban migration alternating with international migration, and when it was shown that much of the transatlantic movement originated within the cities of Britain rather than in the countryside, the theory was undermined and 'the internal migration phase of the "Atlantic economy" collapses' (Baines, 1986: 281). Such a conclusion, however, does not negate the possibility of some kind of linkage between internal and international migrations, and this paper will examine, using examples primarily from Asia, how internal migration can give rise to international movements and how international migrations can stimulate internal movements.

The second attempt to link internal and international migrations was more by association and at the macro-level in the general model of the 'mobility transition' (Zelinsky, 1971). Zelinsky decomposed mobility into international migration and several types of internal migrations, including rural-to-urban, urban-to-urban and circulatory movements that varied systematically through the phases of the demographic transition. While these mobility types varied over time, how one might lead to, or even influence, the other was left unsaid. All were seen to respond to the supply of potential migrants, as generated by the shifting patterns of fertility and mortality with these demographic patterns related to 'modernization' or 'development' in the discourse of the day. The model virtually saw the various types evolving independently in and from any country, even if the relative importance of each type could typify particular stages of demographic and economic development.

Given the many unknowns and the fact that so few studies have attempted to examine internal and international migration within the same

framework, much of what follows is exploratory, raising more questions than it can hope to answer. Elsewhere, I have tried to divide the world into broad regions dependent upon their mix of types of internal and international migration (Skeldon, 1997). Here I will look more explicitly for linkages between internal and international population movements. The remainder of this paper is structured around three major hypotheses:

- That there is a difference between internal and international migration systems
- That internal migration can lead to international migration
- That international migration can lead to internal migration.

Within these general sets of ideas it is important to recognise that international and internal migrations can occur simultaneously from any single population: some sectors of a population may engage in the one and other sectors of the same population in the other. Some may even use these different circuits of mobility at different stages of their lives or to achieve distinct objectives. The issue of scale or level of analysis is also important. Particular individuals may initially move internally and then internationally, or vice versa. If migration is conceptualised as a household risk-minimising strategy, a variety of destinations, both internal and international, might be chosen in order to extend and diversify the household resource base. The aggregate result of such decisions might be large numbers moving overseas from a particular area of origin, which then causes replacement internal migration as a more macro-level response. Hence, micro- and macro-level effects need to be distinguished where data permit.

Equally, it is important to recognise that there are different types of internal and international migrations. Short-distance rural-to-rural internal movements might be more tenuously linked to international migration than rural-to-urban movements, for example, and the international migration of highly skilled professionals might have a greater impact on internal movements than would, say, the international migration of students. Nevertheless, within this matrix of complexity it is important to try to tease out linkages in order to examine how national flows can lead to transnational flows and vice versa.

Populations can be defined not just in terms of the nation (Bailey, 2005), and a central concern must be to investigate how these become transnational entities. The state may still be the key building block in the current international order, but international migrations are creating challenges for the state, in terms of security and how to manage the new migrations.

This paper is not arguing for an inevitability of the one type of migration leading to the other, but simply seeks to examine how internal and international systems can be inter-related. It is argued that theoreticians and policy-makers need to adopt a broader view and a more integrated migration framework to highlight important linkages that hitherto have remained ignored. Some work on the linkages in the labour markets of destination areas in the developed world, such as the work of Salt and Kitching (1992) on the UK, has already been advanced. However, relatively little work appears to have been carried out in the areas of origin of migration and particularly in the developing world.

#### INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: A CLEAR DIFFERENCE?

The different traditions in the study of migration were highlighted in the previous section. It remains to be established whether there are real differences between the systems themselves. Any discussion of linkages must imply that distinct phenomena exist to be linked: in this case, that there is more than just statistical convenience to distinguish internal from international migration. Clearly, what was once internal migration can become international migration at the stroke of a pen should a state dissolve into new countries, as occurred in the cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia. Someone who moved from Tashkent to Almaty in the 1980s was an internal migrant within the Soviet Union, whereas someone moving in the 1990s was an international migrant from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan. These migrations, while geographically the same, became quite different as the creation of the international border generated a series of rights, responsibilities and limitations for the new citizens as well as a means of control between the emergent states.

Movement across an international border is generally not the same as a movement across

an administrative boundary within a country. The state is still the most important unit in the allocation of rights and in the dispensation of law to the peoples who live within its borders and, perhaps most importantly, as the vessel in which populations are contained and identified. While most of these populations are more heterogeneous than the rhetoric of nationhood might recognise, internal circuits of mobility act to link citizens more securely with the state through the military, education and the great centres of commerce in each state. International migration, on the other hand, takes citizens into different jurisdictions, providing challenges for states of both origin and destination. It also must be accepted that internal migration, by concentrating populations close to centres of national power, can also produce challenges to the state and international migrants can work to reinforce the position of domestic elites. Nevertheless, the net effect of internal migration appears to reinforce nationalism and the creation of citizens, while that of international migration is more ambivalent; hence, perhaps, the greater concern given to the minority of international migrants compared with the majority of internal migrants. Internal migration thus seems to operate on a different political as well as geographical plane from international migration, and it seems justified to consider them as two distinct mobility systems.

Having said that there is a basic difference between internal and international migrations, some qualification is immediately required. Some movements across international borders in Asia are indeed more akin to internal migrations than international movements. These occur where international borders bisect single ethnic groups or traditional trading routes, often where the border was imposed by colonial powers without regard to underlying social and political realities. While not as common as in sub-Saharan Africa, there are several examples of this type of migration in Asia: the areas of minority groups in northern Thailand and along the border with Myanmar; between Isan in northeast Thailand and Laos; between southern Vietnam and Cambodia; between Malaysia and adjacent parts of Indonesia; between southern Afghanistan and northern Pakistan; and between Bangladesh and West Bengal in India. In these cases, the borders are usually long, difficult to control and thus highly porous. There is much circulation within

circuits of traditional mobility as well as net shifts of population towards the larger urban areas closest to the frontiers. As the migrants are generally from the same ethnic group, they make up invisible minorities in destination societies where they can assimilate as irregular immigrants. These groups of generally short-distance migrants pose very specific policy issues for both origin and host societies that are particularly difficult to resolve.

Just as migrants who were once internal to a larger country can become international if that country should disintegrate, so too can migrants who were once international become internal if countries unify. The case of Germany is clear, and the trend towards greater unity throughout much of Europe makes what was once international migration a *de facto* internal migration within the countries of the Schengen agreement. Perhaps the only example within Asia is the open border between India and Nepal which means that the international migration from Nepal to India is, in reality, little more than a spatial extension of internal circuits of migration. While the incorporation of Hong Kong into China means that movement from China into Hong Kong is *de jure*, an internal flow within China, in reality the one country, two systems model has maintained the control along the border. However, the progressive moves towards keeping that border open 24 hours a day are likely to see a continual erosion of controls, with adjacent parts of China becoming suburbs of an extended Hong Kong metropolitan area and what would once have been international movements classified as daily and weekly commuting. In 2001, when Hong Kong's population had reached 6.7 million, an average of 333,000 trips back and forth across the border with China were recorded every day, up by 17% over the previous two years (Hong Kong, 2001). Over 80% of these trips were by Hong Kong residents.

Given the importance of irregular migration in Southeast Asia, the significance of the borders might appear to have little impact on the control on movement from one country to another. The most common estimates for the number of irregular migrants in Malaysia in 2002 are in the region of 600,000 (although estimates of 1 million or more exist), with figures for Thailand in 2001 of over 500,000, for example (Battistella and Asis, 2003: 6). Many of these will fall into the group of

cross-border migrants discussed in a previous paragraph, although many are from further afield. As the bureaucratic capabilities of states increase, their ability to manage migration should also improve and the number of irregular migrants will decline. For example, while the overall number of migrant labourers in Malaysia seems to have stabilised over recent years, the proportion of irregular migrants may have declined from around 60% to about 30% (Wong and Anwar, 2003: 172; see also Kanapathy, 2003). In July 2004, there were some 1,359,500 foreign workers registered in Malaysia, accounting for 13% of the employed labour force (Kanapathy, 2005). The documentation of irregular migrants acts to differentiate them clearly from internal migrants. However, the irregular status itself places international migrants in positions of vulnerability, distinguishing them from internal migrants who should have the full rights accorded to all citizens in their home country.

Yet, even the statements in the paragraph above require some qualification. Rights are often not distributed evenly throughout societies, and urban residents often resent the arrival of a large number of peasants in cities as they perceive them to be a threat to the benefits they receive from a market economy. The result may be a 'contested citizenship' in which internal migrants are excluded from access to basic urban services, as Solinger (1999) has so perceptively shown in China. In certain situations, internal migrants, too, may be as vulnerable as international irregular migrants. Thus, while there is a strong case to be made for separate systems of internal and international migration, blurring and overlap exist between the two to the extent that any clear distinction becomes problematic. Such blurring needs to be borne in mind in any search for linkages between the two systems.

#### INTERNAL MIGRATION LEADING TO INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

One of the apparent links between internal and international migration is migrants moving from villages towards urban areas, perhaps the largest city in any country, and then after some time moving on to an international destination. Information concerning opportunities overseas and the bureaucracies that deal with the documentation required for travel, passport, medical and

police clearance and so on, are more likely to be concentrated in the largest cities in any country than in the rural sector. Also, the points of departure for travel overseas by air or ship will be the larger cities. Hence, it might be expected that much of the legal international migration of people not native to the large cities themselves would have to be through those same cities. Transit through the cities is not the same as a migration first to the city and later to an overseas destination.

A more penetrating analysis hypothesises that the expansion of global capital into the periphery mobilises domestic labour through the commercialisation of land, which both pushes people from the rural sector and pulls them towards export processing zones in and around urban centres. Gender relations in this scenario are particularly important. Firstly, women, as lower paid labour, enter into direct competition with men which may result in increased male unemployment. Secondly, women as a lowly paid and vulnerable labour force may face dismissal after a few years as younger, less experienced women become available from more recently contacted rural areas to take their place. Both processes lead to a pool of the unemployed that has both the aspirations and the wherewithal to leave to seek work overseas. Thus, the city or exporting zone becomes a 'step' in a hierarchical pattern of migration from village to town and then overseas. These ideas have been examined by Sassen (1988) in the context of US involvement in the Caribbean.

The weight of evidence from Asia suggests that there is much more variation than this relatively simple model might indicate. A basic problem, however, remains the lack of empirical data upon which to test any relationship between internal and international migrations. Because of the two separate traditions of migration described above, rarely do we have secondary sources that explicitly examine the two types of migration. Longitudinal data on the evolution of migration from any specific country, or area of origin within countries, to see if internal movements preceded international movements, or vice versa, are also uncommon. Data on the specific places of origin of international migrants resident overseas are also elusive. For example, the numbers of Pakistanis or Thais entering the US or Canada each year are known, but little information exists

to tell us from which part of their respective countries they might have come: from Karachi or Quetta, Bangkok or Chiang Mai, let alone from which villages in the countryside. Nevertheless, there are several case studies from Asia that can help to throw light on possible linkages between internal and international population mobility.

A characteristic of all migration is the specificity of origin; migrants tend to come more from some parts of a country than others. Accessibility, or distance from a potential destination, may be a critical factor but there are usually other issues involved as well. It is not always immediately obvious why some groups of people should be much more migratory than others, or have a quite different pattern of mobility from others who might be quite near neighbours. In India, the southern state of Kerala is well known for the importance of its migration to the oil-rich countries of West Asia. Until the 1940s, few of Kerala's population engaged in migration: the state was one of in-migration from other states rather than of out-migration, either to domestic or to overseas destinations (Zachariah *et al.*, 2002). Until the 1970s, Kerala was characterised primarily by migration to other states within India, principally the urban centres of Chennai (Madras), Mumbai (Bombay), Calcutta and Delhi. From the 1970s, migration from Kerala was increasingly dominated by movement overseas, and principally to the Gulf States. While internal migration clearly preceded international migration, it is not at all clear, even from the detailed survey work carried out through the Centre for Development Studies at Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), that the earlier internal migration actually facilitated the later international migration. The earlier internal migration was characterised by the movement of highly educated Hindus and Syrian Christians from the southern part of the state, while the later international migration was characterised by the movement of less educated Muslims from northern Kerala. With regard to internal, inter-state migration, Muslims had the lowest propensity to migrate. Thus, in the case of Kerala, two quite different migration systems appear to have evolved at different times, each dependent upon opportunities available to the migrant communities. Interestingly, the poorest group, the Scheduled Castes, had the lowest propensity to migrate, either internally or internationally, with

those who did move leaving from around the capital Trivandrum.

Other case studies from South Asia help to illustrate how international migration can evolve. The migrations from Pakistan and Bangladesh to the UK are dominated, as in the case of Kerala, by very specific areas of origin: Mirpur in Pakistan (Ballard, 2003) and Sylhet in Bangladesh (Gardner, 1995). 'At least three quarters of British Pakistanis' can trace their origins to a small area in Azad Kashmir and mostly focused on the district of Mirpur (Ballard, 1987: 24). Over 95% of the estimated 200,000 Bangladeshis in Britain in the late 1980s came from Sylhet (cited in Gardner, 1995: 2). Again, in these cases the migration originated in very specific parts, even very particular villages, within the larger areas of Mirpur and Sylhet. Unlike the Keralites, Mirpuris appear to have been extensively engaged in pre-colonial circuits of mobility that took them beyond the bounds of their immediate area. They were involved in riverboat construction, and the river trade took them from their villages in northern Pakistan to the Indian Ocean and beyond. Communities of Mirpuris developed in coastal towns and, with the expansion of British colonialism, as far as Bombay, where they looked for additional sources of work on the docks. The construction of the railway under the British effectively ended large-scale river transport, undermining Mirpuri livelihoods. However, at the same time, the coming of the steam engine created new opportunities on ocean-going ships, in engine rooms and on deck, and Mirpuris began to travel the world.

While some Sylhetis, too, had opportunities in river trade that took them to Calcutta in early colonial times, the critical factor was more the navigability of the Kusiara river which allowed British cargo ships direct access to river ports in the Sylhet district to load jute. Sylhetis, too, became stokers and deckhands and moved into global networks. Some jumped ship in overseas ports to seek alternative employment, others during the Second World War had their ships torpedoed under them and were drawn into war-time factories in northern British cities. These 'beachhead' communities laid the basis for later migration from their communities of origin. These early migrants were almost exclusively male, whereas today the flow is dominated by

the spouses of British-born people of Mirpuri or Sylheti descent. Not all the spouses are female, there are also males for British-born women, but there has clearly been a significant gender shift in the composition of the international flows, largely influenced by changes in British immigration policy. The role of British maritime networks in establishing overseas communities has been observed elsewhere in Asia. They were central in the creation of early Hong Kong communities in Britain, for example (Watson, 1975). The military, as well as colonial labour recruitment policy, also clearly played a critical role in moving people, and primarily men, directly from their villages to overseas destinations.

In countries without such direct colonial involvement, prior internal movement to the larger cities may be a more important precursor to further migration overseas. The vast majority (some 97%) of migrants from Thailand to Singapore in the mid-1990s came from the north-east of the country (Wong, 2000: 68–9). Just 17% had moved directly from their villages, with just over half having previous work experience in Bangkok. Similarly, while just 16% of a sample of migrants from Thailand to Japan had been born in the Bangkok metropolitan region, some 44% had been living there prior to their migration to Japan (Ito and Chunjitkaruna, 2001: 22–3). Thus, internal migration can be an important step to an overseas destination. Nevertheless, a small number of internal migrants who later move on to an international destination establish a direct link between community of origin and the overseas destination which can lead to the bypassing of the internal 'step' in the migration system. Such a process may be extremely difficult to unravel from the available data but, where available, these suggest that the areas of origin of international migration can change over time. Up to the late 1970s some three-quarters of migration from Sri Lanka, for example, came from the capital Colombo and the two surrounding urbanised districts. By the early 1990s, only a third of the international migrants came from these three areas, with significant numbers coming from urban areas in the interior and eastern parts of the island (Gunatilleke, 1995:677).

However, short-circuiting of previous step migration through the capital is only one way in which direct networks between a rural origin and an international destination can be established.

Internal migration is not a necessary condition for international migration to take place. Movement overseas can develop directly from the communities of origin as described in the cases of Sylhet and Mirpur recounted above. The pattern of colonial contact and particularly the activities of brokers in establishing linkages between the communities of potential labour supply and points of commercial activity are central to an understanding of how patterns of migration, both internal and international, develop. In Sri Lanka internal migration does not seem to have been a factor in later international migration (Gunatilleke, 1995: 677). In one Sri Lankan village, for example, a well-educated and former military man, although presumably a former migrant, acted as a sub-agent to arrange the bureaucratic formalities for migration from the village, and particularly for the migration of women (Gamburd, 2000: 60–1). He had the trust of the local population and could travel to the capital to represent the interests of those whose actions were circumscribed by custom and propriety. In Thailand, American contractors had been engaged in the construction of military bases in the northeast of the country during the war in Vietnam, and later transferred to new projects in the Middle East taking their tried and trusted workers with them (Chiengkul, 1986). Thus, direct links between parts of northeast Thailand and overseas destinations became established. Rather than the question of whether internal migration leads to international migration, the central issues revolve around how both internal and international migration evolve as a response to the penetration of outside forces. Clearly, the capital city is a critical node in this penetration, but it is not the only point of intrusion. Transnational companies and importantly brokers can act as intermediaries to establish direct linkages between overseas destinations and small towns, villages or plantations. Sometimes, internal migration may lead to international movements, in other cases they may be alternative and contemporary responses to opportunities offered outside the community, and in yet others they may evolve almost totally separately. What should be abundantly clear, however, is that those looking at internal migration and those looking at international migration are separately studying what are likely to be different spatial responses to similar forces.

These responses to outside forces can be both active in terms of migrants moving to incorporate overseas or national destinations, as we have seen in the South Asian cases, or they can be resistant in terms of populations declining to move to particular destinations. A case of the latter is to be found in northeast China. Here, one of the greatest global migrations of recent history, involving some 25 million people from the densely populated provinces of Shandong and Hebei to Manchuria, took place between the 1890s and the late 1930s (Gottschang and Lary, 2000: 2). Perhaps two-thirds of these migrants returned to their homes in a system of regular circulation, but some 8 million remained in Manchuria helping to reaffirm China's national territory in the face of Japanese expansion. Into this system of internal migration was appended the recruitment of between 100,000 and 200,000 men for service with British and French forces in France in the First World War as non-combatant auxiliaries (Summerskill, 1982). On routine stopovers in Shanghai for medical checks, small numbers of men from the Qingtian area of Zhejiang province in southern China were able to join the recruits from Shandong and have themselves shipped to France. After the end of the war almost all the men from Shandong were repatriated, but some of those from Qingtian stayed on, taking advantage of the presence of small numbers of traders from the province who had reached European cities in previous decades. These early migrants from Qingtian laid the basis for further chain migration from Zhejiang, which created a network of Chinese communities across much of Europe that numbered 25,000 in 1930 and 48,000 by 1995 (Thunø, 1999). Thus, the well-developed internal migration from Shandong never gave rise to sustained international movements despite the existence of external facilitation to do so. Conversely, the extension of an internal trading diaspora to overseas destinations with a little external stimulation has given rise to a substantial international migration which has persisted with fluctuations to the present day.

Returning to the discussion of international migration from areas in South Asia, it can be seen that, although migration to Britain might be the most important flow from some villages in Mirpur and Sylhet in terms of total numbers and volume of remittances sent back, it can coexist

with other flows to international and internal destinations. However, as Gardner made clear (1995: 58), migration to the Middle East for Sylhetis was a second-best option; it was thrust upon young men who did not have the networks to allow them access to Britain as dependants. Even many of those who chose this second option appear not to have gone legally to the Middle East, making this strategy risky, with a high probability of incurring substantial debts if caught. Sylhet, an overwhelmingly rural district of Bangladesh accounting for between 6% and 7% of the total population of the country, does not figure prominently in the internal migration to Dhaka, showing that its migrant horizons are firmly oriented overseas.

Perhaps significantly, the population density per unit of agricultural land of Sylhet is one of the lowest in the country and this may give its residents the resources to migrate overseas compared with those from the districts of Comilla, Noakhali or Faridpur who figure prominently among the migrants to the capital (ESCAP, 1981: 22; Islam, 2003: 135). In fact, all the case studies show that the participants in all the international flows are not among the poorest; they are not 'pushed' overseas. Mirpuris, Sylhetis, and the more recent labour migrants from Thailand did not consider themselves to be from the poorest sectors of their home areas, and the majority of the South Asian emigrants were at least small landholders with access to capital. Only among the Keralites did there appear to be a higher proportion of the unemployed among the emigrants than in the local population, although the unemployment in Kerala is typically of the educated rather than the uneducated.

Important gender issues exist in the above South Asian migrations. The initial movements, both internal, but most particularly international, were dominated by males, and the issue of women left behind and of the changing roles of women in the absence of men has been a recurrent theme in the research on Kerala and Sylhet. In countries such as the Philippines, however, where women dominate the international labour flows, the issue is more of husbands left behind and the potential for family dissolution (Asis, 2001: 52–6). The increasing independent migration of women is another major theme in the literature (Hugo, 2000), although cultural restrictions and even official bans on the emigration of

women limit the mobility of women in Muslim areas and, as seen above in Sri Lanka, even in countries where female autonomy is much greater. Whether the increasing international movement of women from these areas leads to any trend towards more liberal attitudes towards the future migration of women seems unproven.

Whether women migrate internally to the larger cities before securing contracts to go overseas, or whether they migrate directly overseas from their villages, is again unclear from existing data. In a study of the migration of Filipina domestic workers to Hong Kong, it was observed that they tended to come from areas that already had strong traditions of domestic migration (AMWC, 1991: 21). The migration of Thai women into the global sex industry most usually occurred through an intermediate internal migration to Bangkok or one of the major tourist resorts where they could meet agents or clients. Those clients and agents could arrange for some to travel overseas either as wives or to continue their work in the sex industry abroad (Chantavanich *et al.*, 2001a; Skrobanek *et al.*, 1997). Once direct linkages have been established between villages and overseas destinations, further migration can take place directly from the villages to overseas destination, allowing area specialisation to emerge through the consolidation of networks. Thus, for the movement of some women, internal mobility appears to be a precursor of international migration.

One important way in which internal migration can lead to international migration occurs when sources of internal migration to the cities become exhausted and international migration, in effect, replaces or substitutes for the internal movements. This trend has occurred in the more developed parts of Asia and particularly in Japan and South Korea. In 1950, the proportions of the populations of Japan and South Korea that were urban were 34.9% and 21.4% (United Nations, 2004: 54). By 2000, these proportions had risen to 65.2% and 79.6% respectively. The intervening period had seen a massive migration from countryside to cities which effectively drained the rural sector of its population, with few left to migrate by about 1970 in Japan (Fielding, 2004). More important than the total numbers left behind in the villages was their age structure. By the mid-1990s, over half of Japan's land area accounted for only 6.3% of the population, with

one in three aged 60 years or older. These were the *kasos*, or severely depopulating areas, and they accounted for almost two-fifths of Japan's cities, towns and villages (Skeldon, 2001: 46). While Japan has been progressively moving labour-intensive industries overseas, increasing the participation of women in the labour force and driving for increased productivity through automation, the labour deficits in particular sectors have had to be met through importing workers from overseas. International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century has emerged as one of the principal challenges facing Japan and South Korea, countries that have long seen themselves as culturally homogeneous. In these cases, the lack of capacity for further internal migration is a proximate cause for international migration, but for immigration rather than emigration. The non-proximate causes clearly have to be sought in the overall patterns of economic development and in the long-term demographic shifts in the countries in question.

The substitution effect of international migrants can also be seen in the areas of origin of prior internal migration. Particular sectors such as plantations in Malaysia or the rice milling or fishing industries in Thailand would not be viable without workers, legal or irregular, from neighbouring countries. Again, as in the East Asian countries further down the economic and demographic transitions described in the previous paragraph, internal migration from the rural sector is but one factor contributing to the labour deficits. Sustained fertility decline leading to an overall slowing in the growth of the labour force, and improved levels of education leading to aspirations that cannot be satisfied in industries which are perceived as hard and dangerous, are also critical parts of any explanation. Nevertheless, the exodus to the cities has unquestionably contributed to labour deficits in some labour-intensive rural industries.

#### INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LEADING TO INTERNAL MIGRATION

While any argument that internal migration might lead to international migration has been shown to be an oversimplification of a complex issue, the case for international migration leading to internal migration is on much more solid ground. Pronounced emigration from areas in

Kerala, Mirpur or Sylhet has created a vacuum into which people from neighbouring areas can move. The impact of this labour shortage is reinforced by the volume of remittances flowing back to the home areas, stimulating a demand for certain types of goods and services that can only be met through importing workers. In Kerala, where detailed attempts have been made to assess the impact of international migration, remittance income in the year 1999–2000 was estimated at over \$3 billion. It accounted for 23% of the state domestic product and was equivalent to 113% of government expenditure and 208% of the value added in manufacturing (Kannan and Hari, 2002: 209, 216). The emigration has been such as to reduce the natural increase in population growth, the level of unemployment and the incidence of poverty by over 3 percentage points. The resulting construction boom generated labour shortages as early as the mid-1980s, with carpenters and others involved in the industry moving in from the adjacent state of Tamil Nadu (Nair, 1989: 353–6).

Construction booms were also seen in Mirpur and Sylhet and also the New Territories of Hong Kong as a result of the emigration. In the case of Mirpur, wage rates for skilled craftsmen rose, drawing in migrants who lacked access to 'the transnational networks available to the Mirpuris' (Ballard, 2003: 25). Initially these migrants came from surrounding areas, but later they included large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan. The emigration from Sylhet brought sharp increases in the wages of labourers and the creation of jobs in new businesses such as rice milling, as well as in share cropping, and 'large numbers' of landless from neighbouring districts are to be found in the wealthier villages of Sylhet (Gardner, 1995: 67–8, 279). Whether the latter is a direct response to the former, or is of much longer standing, is not clear from Gardner's analysis. Other significant parts of Asia that have developed 'remittance economies' based on very significant international migration include localised parts of coastal China, particularly Fujian and Zhejiang provinces. For example, it is reported that in the village of Houyou in Changle County, Fujian, between 80% and 85% of the registered population have moved to New York, while in other villages the average rate is 50% (Hood, 1998: 33). Whether an exodus of this magnitude is primarily responsible for stimulating an increase in the

local 'floating' population, or migrants from other parts of China who have moved in without officially changing their place of registration, remains an intriguing research question.

The one part of China where the impact of emigration has been intensively examined is in the villages of the New Territories of Hong Kong. There, in the 1950s and 1960s, emigration accelerated the decline of the local agrarian economy, which had been caused by the labour-intensive rice economy being undermined by rising wages in the booming industrial economy in urban Kowloon. However, in favourable locations, the renting of agricultural land to immigrant farmers from China for the cultivation of vegetables became viable (Watson, 1975, 1983). Thus, the integration of villages into a wider economy through international migration redefines location, as some areas can respond to market forces and thrive, while others, less favourably placed, stagnate and embark upon a course of rural depopulation. Ballard (2003), for Mirpur, nicely captures the 'islands' of emigration-supported prosperity in a general sea of economic stagnation. A critical question remains, however, of how sustainable these 'islands' might be in the face of declining cohorts available to emigrate and a resulting declining remittance income. Nevertheless, the process of international migration from a community giving rise to internal migration is but a variant of the hierarchical pattern of migration observed for internal migration in nineteenth-century England by Ravenstein (1885): that migration proceeds in 'steps', with those leaving the village for overseas being replaced by migrants from settlements more isolated or further down the urban hierarchy.

An integrated part of the process of international migration is the return of migrants from overseas. The return of migrants is a part of any migration system, but the return of international migrants can have very particular implications for development, amongst which is its contribution to internal migration. Return migrants are, in effect, the human dimension of remittances. Whether returnees have a significant impact on their areas of origin will depend on the type of migrant. Theoretically, all labour migrants must return as part of the conditions of their contract, but many of the migrants to Britain who manage to secure citizenship in the UK still dream of return. As implied in earlier discussions, most

will have built houses in their home villages or nearby towns, the construction of which may have generated the in-migration of workers from neighbouring areas. Whether their physical return will generate further in-migration from surrounding areas is much more difficult to assess. It will depend upon how successful the returnees are in establishing local businesses in what may be labour-deficit areas. Evidence from Mirpur, for example, suggests that the chances of success for the majority are limited (Ballard, 1987: 28–9). Living expenses are higher than expected, credit is difficult to obtain, and local bureaucracies are obstructive. In general, the potential for generating wealth in areas whose limitations contributed to the out-migration in the first place appears restricted. Returning Thai workers, too, are often still in debt and are not able to use any skills that they may have learned when overseas (Chantavanich *et al.*, 2001b). Findings from Kerala, where there were some 750,000 returnees in 2000, primarily from the Gulf, were broadly similar: that personal mobility and community development lagged behind expectations and that return migrants 'are now a disillusioned lot' (Zachariah and Kannan, 2002: 6).

Nevertheless, in considering the potential of returning international migrants to stimulate internal migration, attention needs to be focused on a minority of wealthy returnees who need not necessarily invest in the home areas but in areas in their home countries where a viable financial return is likely. Specifically, attention needs to be paid to the role of migrant groups such as the overseas Chinese, the *Viet Kieu* or the non-resident Indians. In practice, it may be difficult to separate their contribution from that of foreign direct investment in general. However, the impact that these numerically few returnees can have, either through their own businesses or through multinational companies, generates employment opportunities that can stimulate internal migration towards industrial areas such as those in the Pearl River delta region of southern China, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, or Bangalore in southern India. The returnees themselves, if they settle in an area other than the one in which they were born, become, in effect, internal migrants. Migrants from a village, for example, might choose to return to the capital city or the nearest large town in a type of 'J-turn' migration.

Those who have migrated internationally need not return at all in order for them to have an impact on internal migration. They may continue to live in London, New York or Los Angeles and commute back to their countries of origin regularly or occasionally to oversee investments which generate internal migration to these new centres of economic activity. The role of diaspora communities in promoting development in origin countries is still poorly understood (Newland and Patrick, 2004), but remittances from overseas migrants are seen as one of the most significant and stable financial flows from the developed to the developing world (Ratha, 2003). Nevertheless, as suggested at the outset of this article, the impact of both returned international migrants and migrants based overseas can be much more than just economic: they can bring about political change, which could in turn promote further internal and international movements.

## CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to explore linkages between internal and international migration. Initially, it was argued that differences of sufficient magnitude between internal and international migration exist to allow them to be considered as separate systems, thus allowing linkages to be postulated. That such linkages occur seems indisputable, but how the migrations are related has rarely been examined, mainly because of the separate traditions of study that have grown up on each of the two types of migration. Cases were examined from available case material from various parts of Asia. Much of the discussed international migration from and to Asian countries was fairly recent and was long pre-dated by systems of internal movement, despite the fact that there had indeed been long-established trading diasporas in the region. Also, although the vast majority of those who migrated did so internally, no 'natural' progression from internal to international migration from any area or community in any particular country appeared to exist. There were cases of internal migration leading to international migration, but equally important appeared to be the generation of international movements from areas without prior internal migration. Colonial contacts and, more specifically and recently, the role of brokers were important in initiating those

movements. The one clear generalisation that can perhaps be made is that in those societies where both a transition to low fertility and mortality and rapid economic development have occurred, sources of internal migration have become exhausted and governments resort to international migration as a substitute for the previous internal movements. Attempts to manage the international movements can vary from explicit programmes of labour importation, as in the case of Malaysia, to more tacit acceptance of irregular movements to fulfil the needs of national entrepreneurs, as in Thailand. Thus, variety of outcome characterises any transition from countries that were dominated by internal movements to those that have evolved a range of types of international population movement, with international migration not being simply the result of previous internal movements. Thus, although internal migration can lead to international migration, it is not a necessary precondition.

The alternative hypothesis posed at the outset of the paper appears more straightforward: international migration indeed gives rise to internal population movements. The vacuums created in specific areas of origin of international migration, combined with the receipt of remittances from overseas, act as key factors of attraction to draw internal migrants in from neighbouring, often remoter areas on a circular or longer-term basis. Thus, poorer internal migrants are linked to wealthier international migrants through hierarchical patterns of population movement. It is too early to conclude at this stage from the available data whether these local movements will later extend to international destinations.

The argument illustrates that, despite the variety of outcome, generalisations that were first formulated on the basis of internal migration alone, such as ideas about hierarchical systems of migration and step movements, can be used to link internal and international migrations. Both migrations are conditioned by networks, by personal networks built up by the migrants themselves, and by institutional networks such as those created by brokers. The fact that there is nothing inevitable in the way migration develops, as indicated by the example of Shandong, does not deny the significance of linkages to a wider world through the forces of globalisation as the principal driving force of migration. The selection of internal and international desti-

nations can be viewed as competing strategies in a matrix of opportunities provided. Thus internal and international population movements can be viewed within a single theoretical framework, and theories developed from internal migration can be applied to international migrations and vice versa, as Pryor (1981) envisaged so many years ago. Internal and international migrations create an integrated system, and to consider one without the other, as has been so common in previous research, is to look at only one part of a unified system and produces an unbalanced interpretation.

Much still remains to be done. A significant part of the interrelationship between international and internal migration which was not examined in this paper is the impact that international migration can have on labour or housing markets of destination countries. This omission was simply because, unlike in parts of the developed world in the West, this trend is not yet a major issue within Asia. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants in global cities such as New York, Sydney or London may have encouraged natives to move out as a result of the immigrants depressing wage levels and housing prices and creating ethnic enclaves: international migration thus giving rise to internal migrations. Given restrictive immigration policies throughout Asia, it is difficult to envisage such developments over the immediate future. Within the regions of origin themselves, much remains to be done on the relative roles of internal and international migration and state formation: whether international flows from specific origins act to undermine the polity through the creation of transnational identities, whereas internal migrations act to strengthen the state through centripetal flows to the major centres of power in a state, for example. Despite the many unknowns and the varieties of outcome, in the twenty-first century and in a globalising world it is no longer possible to view internal and international migration separately. This paper has attempted to chart a path towards an integrated framework by highlighting how internal and international population movements are linked.

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