Internal and International Migration: Bridging the Theoretical Divide

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ABSTRACT

The interdisciplinary field of migration studies is riven with binaries, one of the most fundamental of which is its split into internal and international migration, characterised by different literatures, concepts, methods and policy agendas. Most migration scholars nowadays are researching international migration, even though, quantitatively, internal migration is more important. Yet the distinction between internal and international moves becomes increasingly blurred, not only because of geopolitical events and the changing nature and configuration of borders, but also because migrants’ journeys are becoming increasingly multiple, complex and fragmented. Nevertheless, there remain both many similarities and many differences between these two ‘migration traditions’.

The paper is in three main sections. First we present a schematic model which sets out 10 migration pathways which combine internal and international migration, and return migration, in various sequenced relationships. Second, we survey the limited literature which attempts to compare and integrate internal and international migration within the same theoretical framework – both general models and some case-study literature from Mexico. We consider three approaches where theoretical transfer seems to hold potential – systems analysis, studies of migrant integration, and the migration-development nexus. The final part of the paper looks in more detail at the case of Albania where since 1990 there has been contemporaneous mass emigration and internal migration. We deploy both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the links between the two forms of migration in the Albanian context, demonstrating how closely they are entwined both in the macro-dynamics of regional population change and in individual and family biographies of mobility.

In conclusion, we argue that there is considerable potential for integrating the study of internal and international migration, both at the theoretical and the empirical level. Too often one is studied without reference to the other, yielding a partial analysis. However, we baulk at attempting any ‘grand theory’ of migration which incorporates all types of migration, in all places and at all times.


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Introduction
Amongst the many binaries that dissect the field of migration studies – forced vs. voluntary, temporary vs. permanent, legal vs. illegal etc. – one stands out as a most fundamental bifurcation, that between internal and international migration. There have emerged, over the past half-century or so, two almost entirely separate literatures, written from different conceptual, theoretical and methodological standpoints, which rarely talk to each other. This dichotomisation seems to have been influenced by several factors, including different data sources, different disciplinary backgrounds of researchers, different analytical techniques, and different research agendas which reflect different policy concerns and funding sources (Salt and Kitching 1992:148; Skeldon 2006: 17). Champion (1993: 2) has spoken of ‘the major degree of apartheid’ in the two migration research traditions, endorsing Salt and Kitching’s view that the persistence of this division ‘both hampers the development of migration theory and hinders our understanding of the role which migration plays in processes of population change’ (1992: 160).

The mutual separation of these two ‘migration traditions’ (Skeldon 2006: 16-18) is evidenced in striking ways which are all too easily overlooked, such as the reference to just one type under the general heading ‘migration’, as if the other type did not exist. Especially in the last decade or so, ‘migration’ has somehow come to mean ‘international migration’. Castles and Miller’s *Age of Migration*, first published in 1993, is an age of international migration; Myron Weiner’s *Global Migration Crisis* (1995) is a crisis of international migration; Robin Cohen’s *Cambridge History of World Migration* (1995) is a history of international migration; Brettell and Hollifield’s *Migration Theory* (2000) is a theory of international migration; and finally (so as not to labour the point too much) the International Organisation for Migration’s periodic *World Migration Reports* (2000; 2003; 2005) are reports on international migration.

Conversely, earlier theorisations of migration were really about internal migration, ignoring the international dimension. Ravenstein’s ‘laws of migration’ (1885; 1889) were derived from his observations on internal movements of population, although longer distance moves, such as across the Atlantic, were not entirely overlooked (Grigg 1977). Four more examples: Stouffer’s gravity modelling and his considerations of the roles of place utility and intervening opportunity (1960), Sjaastad’s cost-benefit analysis of migration (1962), Wolpert’s behavioural
perspective on the decision to migrate (1965), and Lee’s (1966) theorisation of migration à la Ravenstein, were all about explaining migration within countries, often in a rather abstract fashion.¹

Three further points can be made by way of general introduction. First, the question of numbers and scale. The official UN estimate for the ‘stock’ of international migrants – i.e. those living outside their country of birth – was 175 million in 2000 (IOM 2003: 5). Six years later this estimate stood at 191 million, and by the end of the decade the figure must surely pass 200 million. Still, this is less that 3 per cent of global population. There is no global estimate for internal migration, for obvious reasons of data unavailability and the difficulty of deciding exactly what is the minimum threshold distance for an internal move to be recorded. However, just to quote some figures to put the scale of internal migration into perspective, in 2001 the number of internal migrants in China stood at more than 100 million (Deshingkar and Grimm 2005: 10), whilst according to the Indian census data of the same year, more than 300 million people were classified as internal migrants in India, representing 30 per cent of the country’s population (Deshingkar 2006: 3). So, put crudely, internal migration in China and India alone is double the total number of global international migrants. Another perspective on the scale of internal migration is given by figures on global urbanisation. Over the century-span 1900-2000 the number of people living in cities increased more than twenty-fold from 262 million (163 million in developed countries, 99 million in developing countries) to 2856 million (882 million in the developed and 1974 million in the developing world). In the developing world of Asia, Africa and Latin America approximately 40 per cent of urbanisation is by internal migration (Skeldon 2006:16; 2008: 2-4). We need to stress, therefore, that the ‘age of migration’ is also an age of mass internal migration, especially in those countries that are less developed, but rapidly developing.

Second, there is the issue of the precise definitional distinction between the two forms of migration. Quite apart from individuals and households that are mobile both internally and internationally (of which more anon), the ‘boundary’ between internal and international migration can easily become blurred. Certainly distance is not a defining criterion: contrast a 10km relocation from Geneva across the border into France (where housing and cost-of-living are cheaper) with a 4000km move from

¹ For useful overviews of this and other key literature on internal migration see White and Woods (1980: 1-56).
New York to California, or from interior China to the burgeoning economy of the eastern coast. Furthermore, the nature of international borders can change: the European Union and its frontier-free ‘Schengenland’ create a borderless zone for mobility which is more akin to internal migration than ‘traditional’ international migration with its regime of passports, visas and border controls. Moreover, borders themselves can be mobile; they can appear or disappear, or move across people. German unification transformed international migrants into internal migrants. The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia had the opposite effect: former internal migrants became ‘international’ migrants or minorities (e.g. Russians in the Baltic States of the FSU, or Bosnians in Slovenia). This process is not unique to Europe (on which see King 2002) but also takes place in other parts of the world (see Adepoju 1998 on Africa; Skeldon 2006 on Asia).

The African example is particularly pertinent because of the way in which the demarcation first of colonial territories and then of new nation-state boundaries after independence in the 1960s has cut through areas across which there was once free movement based on ethnic or tribal affiliations, or on nomadic circuits. In some cases these mobilities have been allowed to continue; in other cases they have been blocked; in yet other cases differential development of adjacent states has stimulated new cross-border migrations which are economically driven; and in yet other cases again war, ethnic strife and genocide have triggered refugee migrations (see Adepoju 1998 for examples of all these). Indeed Zacharia and Condé (1981) maintain that, within Africa, emigration can be regarded as simply an extension of internal migration. Conceptually, according to these authors, both types of migration derive from the same set of fundamental causes: inequalities in development, employment prospects, incomes and living conditions between and within countries. Internal and international migration are thus complementary and can indeed supplement or substitute each other, according to changing political and economic circumstances. For West Africa, the volume of internal migration is estimated at twice that of international migration (Adepoju 1998: 389).

The third and final introductory point we wish to make concerns the variable stress on the differences vis-à-vis the similarities between internal and international migration. The African examples just cited emphasised similarities. The situation in other parts of the world may be very different. For Zolberg (1989: 405), international migration, especially to wealthy countries, inevitably brings in a political economy
perspective which recognises the importance of international relations and the control that states exercise over their own borders; hence international migration is a ‘distinctive social process’ in which the container of the state has fundamentally different functions from a region or census tract within a country. Immigration controls and regulations have major implications for migrants in terms of the right to enter a country (through a visa for instance), to reside for a given length of time there, and to access citizenship rights such as education, employment, healthcare, political participation etc. Linguistic and cultural barriers often characterise international migration, although this is by no means always the case: in some instances such obstacles may be more evident in internal moves than international.

An emphasis on similarities, on the other hand, might question whether there are fundamental differences beyond the crossing of an international border; such an interpretation might conclude that the basic drivers of mobility are the same for both internal and international migration, and hence ask what all the fuss is about. This is a view that, in the final analysis, we have some sympathy with, as we shall demonstrate later; but we also caution against the too-easy glibness of this stance, which ignores the reality of the ‘two traditions’ situation outlined above as well as the global political economy of international migration. What we wish to do in this paper, rather, is to affirm the value of integrating the two traditions, for each has much to learn from the other.

Our paper now continues as follows. In the next section we present and discuss a schematic model of the sequencing and linkages between internal and international migration, building in return migration as an additional element. We make brief references to empirical literature to provide supporting evidence of the various migration trajectories discussed. Following that, we review the very limited literature which compares the behaviour and impacts of internal and international migrants in those countries, such as Mexico and the Philippines, where some attempts at integrated comparative analysis have been made. Next we look at the existing attempts to integrate internal and international migration theory. Then, in the final main section of the paper, we present a case study of Albania, a country with an intense experience of both internal and international migration in recent years and where these two types of migration exhibit interlocking patterns. The conclusion summarises our key arguments and points to the opportunities for a more integrated theorisation of migration, both internal and international. We do not, however,
pretend that there is a ‘grand theory’ for all types of migration. Whilst we do see considerable potential for cross-fertilisation of theoretical approaches between internal and international migration, we also recognise that migration has become an increasingly diversified set of processes, each requiring its own particular combination of theoretical ideas.

**Linking and sequencing internal and international migration: a schema**

Figure 1 is an attempt to portray, in a simplified way, a range of options by which internal and international migration interface with each other. We imagine two countries, X and Y, each divided into two regions, Xa and Xb, and Ya and Yb. X is the migrant’s origin country, and Y the destination country. We might further imagine that Xa is a rural region and Xb an urban centre, such as the country’s capital city. In the case of country Y, Ya might be a principal city and Yb a provincial region. In order to make the diagram more ‘real’, we can suggest that X is Italy, Y is Britain and the time period the 1950s and 1960s, when around 150,000 Italians migrated to Britain, mainly from the rural south of Italy (King 1977: 178). Hence Xa is southern Italy, Xb is Rome or Milan, Ya is London and Yb another region of England. The various migration trajectories are numbered 1 to 10.

Let us quickly run through the first five trajectories. Pathway 1 is a simple internal migration – for instance from rural southern Italy, say Sicily or Calabria, to Milan or to Rome. Path 2 is a direct international migration – from southern Italy straight to London. Trajectory 3 sees internal migration preceding an international move: so, form Calabria to Rome, and thence, later, to London. This is a stepwise migration, perhaps facilitating a staged adjustment to urban life along the way. Path 4 presents a different sequence: international migration first, followed by a subsequent internal migration in the country of settlement: this time, then, from Calabria to London, and later to another place such as Bristol or Birmingham. Why might an Italian migrant move in this way? Much post war Italian migration to Britain has been linked to service trades such as the catering sector (King 1978a), so we can envisage a young

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2 Neither of these one-leg pathways should be thought of as unchallenging from the migrant’s point of view. A move in the 1950s from poverty and subsistence agriculture in a hill-village in Calabria to a factory in Milan or a building site in Rome constituted a shift which, albeit internal migration, was practically from one ‘world’ to another, with different lifestyles, cultures, even languages (the dialects of Milan and Calabria, for example, being mutually almost unintelligible). Likewise, whilst nowadays a trip from the south of Italy to London might take two hours by plane and cost very little on a budget airline, in the early post war decades the train and boat journey would last 2-3 days, be quite expensive, and involve several changes.
man from the Italian south coming to work in London in the 1960s as a waiter, and then later moving to a provincial city to open his own restaurant, perhaps with the help of family members. Finally, pathway 5 combines 3 and 4 and sees the international move sandwiched by internal migrations both in the country of origin and destination.

We now examine in more detail the two main ways in which internal and international migration are sequenced: first, internal leading to international; second, international leading to internal. In comparing these two pathways (3 and 4 on Figure 1), issues arise over the scale of analysis: are we dealing with a single individual or family unit, or with larger aggregates such as village communities, regions, or entire countries? It is also important to realise that internal and international migrations can occur simultaneously from any given population, or even from one family. Our Albanian evidence will exemplify this later in the paper.

*Internal migration leading to international migration*

This is widely regarded in the migration literature as the most logical sequence, enabling rural-origin migrants to familiarise themselves first with the urban environment of their own country before venturing abroad on a subsequent international migration. A period spent working in a town or city is often necessary in order to accumulate the financial resources and contacts needed to effect emigration, including documents (passport, visa, health clearance etc.) and purchase of tickets and other travel services.³ Also, the points of departure for overseas migration will tend to be a major city or port. Amongst well-known examples of this form of internal-to-international stepwise migration we cite Turkey (King 1976: 70-72), Thailand (Skeldon 2006: 22-24 quoting various Thai sources) and Mexico (Cornelius 1992; del Rey Poveda 2007: 291-292; Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999; Zabin and Hughes 1995).

The Mexican case is the most thoroughly documented, although different researchers’ results, based in different source regions and carried out within different time frames, are far from consistent. Cornelius (1992) found increasing evidence of ‘step-migrants’ amongst Mexicans in California. He concluded that ‘rather than simply absorbing internal migrants from the countryside and provincial cities as they have done for many years, Mexico’s large urban centres today are serving

³ Of course, transit through such major cities is not the same as migration first to the city and then, later, emigration abroad.
increasingly as platforms for migration to the United States’ (Cornelius 1992: 162-163). Zabin and Hughes (1995) confirm this trend: they found that more than three-quarters of Mexican migrants from Oaxaca in southern Mexico had worked in other Mexican states (chiefly Baja California and Sinaloa) before emigrating to the US. On the other hand Lozano Ascencio et al. (1999: 140) conclude that ‘direct migration from rural areas to international destinations seems to have been the norm in international migration flows from Mexico to the United States since the last century’.

There are many variations on this basic theme of internal leading to international migration. The emigration may be preceded by more than one internal move in a multi-step migration – for instance from small village to provincial town and then on to the national capital (see again Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999 on Mexican migration). The Mexican material also provides evidence of other refinements to the ‘internal then international’ sequence. For instance, an initial stepwise migration from village to town, succeeded by emigration, can lead to follow-on situations whereby the provincial towns get ‘saturated’ with excessive numbers of rural migrants who, instead, start migrating directly abroad, facilitated by their social networks with previous migrants who have settled in distinct locations in the US (Lindstrom and Lauster 2001). Another Mexican variation is direct migration from central and southern Mexico (Oaxaca, Veracruz etc.) to the ‘hybrid’ US/Mexico border cities and export-oriented zones aligned along it (see Cornelius and Martin 1993; del Rey Poveda 2007).

If we de-couple migration trajectories from the individual/family scale and look at broader-scale regional and national trends (so that it is not the same migrants who are migrating internally and then internationally, but different cohorts or aggregates of migrants), then we observe other situations whereby an internal migration stage leads ultimately to international migration. The cases of Japan and South Korea provide one type of situation. Here massive rural-urban internal migration during the second half of the twentieth century left rural areas demographically drained with mainly a residual ageing population left behind. With the balance of population distribution shifted in this way from countryside to cities, most international migration has been sourced from urban areas (Skeldon 2006: 24-25).

Japan and South Korea also illustrate another kind of knock-on effect involving internal migration leading to international migration, but this time from the perspective of immigration not emigration. At ‘stage one’ the development of the
urban industrial and service economy is fed by streams of internal migrants from rural areas. Once this internal reservoir of rural migrants runs dry, ‘stage two’ sees their replacement by international migrants from a variety of poorer Asian countries (plus, in the case of Japan, ethnic Japanese from Brazil). This staged model of internal migration leading to immigration in a rapidly developing (but demographically stagnant) economy has been more formally presented for Southern Europe, especially the paradigmatic case of Italy, by King et al. (1997: 9-13). Over the period between the 1950s and the 1990s, the northern Italian industrial economy first drew labour supplies from adjacent rural areas, then from Southern Italy, and finally from overseas in an ever-widening search for appropriate low-skilled workers.

The dominant role of capital over labour and its migration is also the guiding theme of the ‘Sassen thesis’ on the penetration of global capital into peripheral, labour-rich parts of the world. Through the purchase of land and the setting up of export processing zones in and around urban areas of Less Developed Countries (LDCs), foreign and multinational corporations attract workers (especially females) from rural areas to their labour-intensive industrial processing plants. When structural changes result in unemployment (the factory closes down, moves elsewhere, downsizes, or rotates its labour pool), or the migrant decides to leave for other reasons, the second step of the migration takes place, this time abroad. According to Sassen (1988), this sequence of events is underpinned by the predatory behaviour of global capital, which first dislodges labour to work in manufacturing zones in LDCs and then, when the industry contracts or the labour is otherwise regarded as ‘expendable’, the workers, unwilling to return to their villages which offer them nothing, emigrate in search of new work opportunities. Ample evidence for this migration sequencing can be found in studies on Mexican-US migration (Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999), the Caribbean and some Asian countries (Skeldon 2006: 21).

A final problem in longitudinally linking internal with subsequent international migration concerns data availability. Rarely are such biographical data available, except from small-scale research studies, which are themselves all too rare (Skeldon 2006: 21).

*International migration leading to internal migration*

This is trajectory 4 on Figure 1. Champion (1993: 5) poses the relevant research questions: ‘What happens when an international migrant … becomes an internal
migrant by moving address within the new country of residence? Does this next move
take on a character which is indistinguishable from the normal pattern of internal
movements of longer-term residents with similar characteristics, or does it represent
part of a longer period of adjustment arising from the international move that sets
international movers apart?’ Literature on this migration sequence is rather limited,
since it tends to be split into two separate fields of study: international migration, and
internal population redistribution. The latter phase has been quite extensively studied
by population geographers in the UK and USA; however their view has generally
been less one of linking internal moves to the international moves that preceded them,
and more one of seeing the internal mobility of international migrants and ethnic
minorities within the frame of overall internal migration and regional population
change (Belanger and Rogers 1992; Nogle 1994; Salt and Kitching 1992). To take one
rather particular example, studies of refugees’ internal migrations in the US, UK and
Sweden have shown that their initial dispersal, designed to relieve pressure on capital
cities, has been followed by secondary migration from peripheral locations to more
favoured metropolitan locations where refugees often see better opportunities
(Gordon 1987; Hammar 1993; Robinson and Hale 1990).

As with pathway 3, it is very difficult to get good empirical data on this dual
migration process. Comparison of decennial census records can reveal both aggregate
and pattern changes (e.g. between region Ya and Yb), but the precise nature of spatial
change is obscured – in other words, an increase in migrants from country X resident
in Yb and a (proportionate) decrease in Ya could be due either to internal migration of
X migrants from Ya to Yb, or to direct entry of international migrants to Yb. Two
solutions respond to this problem: the availability of population registers which
separately record the internal mobility of ‘foreigners’ or international migrants (e.g.
Andersson 1996 for Sweden); or the analysis of linked census records such as the 1
per cent Longitudinal Study (LS) within Britain, used by Fielding (1995) and

Both Fielding and Robinson used the 1971-81 LS, which matches a sample of the
census returns for 1981 with the same individuals in 1971. The LS therefore allows
the researcher to trace part of the life course of individuals (such as immigrants) from
one census to another, and to compare certain recorded characteristics (such as socio-
occupational status and location) with those of the population as a whole, or with
other groups. Robinson (1992) found that immigrants from the Caribbean had low
social and low geographical mobility over the period in question, whereas Indians and Pakistanis were highly mobile inter-regionally, especially the Indians who exhibited, over time, high rates of upward mobility into the middle class. Fielding (1995) carried out a more detailed and disaggregated analysis of Black and Asian social mobility – showing for instance that Asians moved strongly from ‘blue collar’ to ‘petty bourgeois’ occupational classes, whilst Afro-Caribbeans remained (relatively speaking and especially males) trapped in blue collar jobs with increasing unemployment – but he did not match these different immigrant social trajectories with geographical mobility, which can therefore only be inferred from the general finding validated in several other studies that ‘upward mobility … increases the likelihood of inter-regional migration’ (Fielding 2007: 109).

The key question, then, is: how does the social mobility of immigrants map onto their geographical mobility within migrant-receiving countries like Britain, the US or Italy? There is no unified answer to this question; the limited literature throws up some clues but these are not consistent and are highly context-dependent. Data on Albanians in Italy offers one perspective (King and Mai 2002; 2004). Albanians are the most widely dispersed of all immigrant groups in Italy; that is, they are the immigrant nationality whose spatial distribution most closely matches that of the native population. Moreover, they have a high rate of internal mobility from southern regions (especially Apulia, the arrival point of many) towards richer, northern regions such as Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Veneto which are the most economically dynamic in Italy and therefore offer the best employment prospects.

Fielding (2007: 111, 127) deploys his notion of London as an ‘escalator region’ (natives migrate to London as a strategy of rapid or escalated socio-occupational advancement; Fielding 1992) to explain the high concentration there of international migrants, and goes on to suggest that the capital also functions as a social-class escalator for the internal migration of international immigrants as well. However Fielding also notes (2007: 127) that immigrant occupational status in the UK is quite polarised between the highly skilled and the unskilled, with the former more spatially mobile than the latter. Fielding’s escalator hypothesis is somewhat contradicted by Andersson (1996: 15) who shows that, although immigrants are twice as concentrated in Stockholm as their proportion of the total population, they are less likely than the

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4 More than 40 per cent of the UK’s immigrants live in London, compared to only 10 per cent of the UK-born population; immigrants make up 26 per cent of London’s population.
Swedish-born to migrate internally to the capital. Andersson hypothesises that, since the labour market for the highly educated is less competitive outside the capital-city region, this provides better opportunities for highly-educated immigrants to succeed elsewhere in the country.

As with pathway 3, so too for pathway 4 there are many variations and nuances in the sequencing of migration types. A semantic shift from ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreign-born’ to ‘migrant communities’ or ‘ethnic minorities’ opens up the important issue of inter-generational socio-spatial mobility and especially the internal migration behaviour of the second generation. Whilst there has been a great deal of interest in the educational and employment profiles of the second generation in Europe (see the special collections edited by Crul 2007; Crul and Vermeulen 2003a; especially the overview papers by Crul and Vermeulen 2003b; Thomson and Crul 2007) this has not been matched by parallel research into their changing locational distribution within European host societies. In the US, on the other hand, a growing line of research by population geographers explores the extent to which the second and 1.5 generations are becoming more spatially dispersed than the original, i.e. first-generation, immigrants. Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) and Goodwin-White (2007), for instance, have critically evaluated – and to some extent rejected – the notion that the ‘integration’ of the second and 1.5 generations will be reflected in their geographical dispersal away from the settlement concentrations of their parents.

Two factors complicate this line of analysis. The first is that integration (or assimilation, the term more commonly used in the US) is not a linear, inevitable process: US sociologists nowadays speak of ‘downward’ or ‘segmented’ assimilation in which various pathways are open to the second generation, including assimilation into ‘mainstream, middle-class America’, assimilation into an ‘underclass’ of low wages, poverty and unemployment, and assimilation into the ‘ethnic community’ (see Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993). The second complication relates to the spatial

5 The ‘pure’ second generation are those born in a host society to parents who are first-generation immigrants, i.e. born abroad. Often, however, this definition is extended to those children who were born abroad but immigrated with their parents at a young age, e.g. before age 6. Likewise there is no standard or official definition of the 1.5 generation; for Goodwin-White (2007) it is those who immigrated (to the US) before age 12.

6 This line of thinking reflects ‘classical’ US assimilation theory, with its strong echoes of the Chicago School, whereby immigrants move through urban zones (often to be replaced by ‘new’ immigrants) as they ‘progress’ socio-economically and culturally, achieving complete assimilation perhaps by the third generation. In other words there is an assumed correlation between economic, social and cultural assimilation on the one hand, and spatial assimilation on the other. There is an extensive US literature on the spatial (non-)assimilation of first and subsequent generation immigrants; see, inter alia, Alba et al. (1999), Allen and Turner (1996), Frey (1996), Glazier (1998), Kritz and Nogle (1994), Logan et al. (1996), Zelinsky and Lee (1998).
scale of analysis: how is internal migration measured? Local-scale relocation of the second generation – for instance from inner-city immigrant enclaves to suburban estates – may be missed by analyses which focus on inter-state or inter-city redistribution. Fielding, Ellis and Goodwin-White are alive to these issues.

Fielding, generalising from across the range of developed-country urban systems, concludes that despite the fact that ‘the children of immigrants, on balance, do better than their parents’ in occupational class terms, ‘the notion that the next generation will become more spatially dispersed than the original migrants … is not borne out by the facts’ (2007: 133). This statement is certainly backed up by recent US evidence. Ellis and Goodwin-White (2006) find that inter-state migration of the 1.5 generation, of all levels of education, occurs less than expected, especially for those states with high concentrations of immigrants (California, Texas, New York, New Jersey and Florida); by contrast, internal exodus is high for 1.5 generationers initially resident in states with low concentrations of migrants (2006: 915, 920-921). This conclusion is reinforced when destination choice is analysed (Goodwin-White 2007): increasing concentrations are evident, via 1.5 generation internal migration, in regions and metropolitan areas which have both high numbers of immigrants and high economic growth (especially the former). This implies a spatially segmented (as opposed to a purely spatial) model of immigrant, 1.5 and second-generation internal migration.

Fielding takes a different cut at the ‘segmentation’ hypothesis, based on net migration of self-defined ethnic groups in and out of one city-region (London) over the 1991-2001 period, using the LS. He finds the following pattern: White British, other white and mixed-race people net-migrate out of the capital-city region (by -6 per cent, -12 per cent and -11 per cent respectively); Indians, Pakistanis and Black Africans all post net migration gains (8 per cent, 6 per cent, 10 per cent respectively); and other ethnic groups (Bangladeshis and Chinese) have weak net migration rates (Fielding 2007: 134).

In addition to the direct, ‘onward’ migration of international migrants or ethnic minorities, another set of more indirect links between international and internal migration is outlined by Champion (1996). These can be regarded as ‘knock-on’ effects, whose causality is not necessarily implied in one direction or another. Champion (1996: 1-4) nominates three such impacts – displacement, substitution and diversion. He quotes some revealing aggregate figures: during the 1980s, London gained 126,000 people through net international migration whilst losing 387,000
through net out-migration to the rest of the UK (Champion and Congdon 1992). *Displacement* (or, perhaps, *replacement*) describes the situation whereby the arrival of international migrants in a country is accompanied by or precipitates the out-migration of natives (or, indeed, of previous cohorts of immigrants) from the areas where the new immigrants settle. Two lines of causality might take place: in the first the migrants displace natives by undercutting the existing wage level and/or by reducing the residential attractiveness of the areas they settle in; in the second case immigrants replace the already declining population of natives by taking up existing vacancies in the job and housing markets left by the locals’ out-migration. Secondly, *substitution* refers to a situation where immigrants take advantage of opportunities in a particular area (again, jobs or housing) that would otherwise have been taken by internal migrants. Thus international migration substitutes internal migration which thereby becomes reduced. Salt and Kitching (1992: 153-155) describe the situation in the UK hotel and catering industry, concentrated in London and the South East, where employers have turned to international migrants because of their inability to recruit workers from the UK’s high unemployment regions. In this way, international migration results from (and, in turn, probably exacerbates) the internal immobility of certain categories of unemployed labour. Thirdly, *diversion* is the term used by Champion to describe the situation in which potential internal migrants to one area, having seen the opportunities taken up there by international migrants, choose to move anyway but to an adjacent or alternative region where the opportunities are better than they are at home, but not as good as in their first-preference destination area.

An entirely separate form of international leading to internal migration takes place within the sending country. Large-scale emigration from one particular set of regions creates a vacuum into which internal migrants from other parts of the country can move in another form of replacement migration. Cases of this phenomenon are noted for South Asian areas of high overseas emigration such as Mirpur (Pakistan), Kerala (India) and Sylhet (Bangladesh): in these areas shortage of labour due to emigration and to new wealth created by remittances has stimulated migration of poor workers from adjacent regions (Gardner 1995: 67-68, 279; Nair 1989: 353-356; Skeldon 2006):

7 Of course, this can also occur internationally. Taking two examples from Southern Europe, mass emigration from Portugal created vacancies in the construction industry for immigrants from Cape Verde after the 1960s; and mass emigration from Sicily in the early post-war decades opened up opportunities for immigration from nearby Tunisia into labour market niches in fishing and tourism.
De Haas (2007: 25-26) notes similar patterns of migration in Morocco, where internal migrant labourers from poorer villages and regions are attracted not only to the rural areas of origin of international migrants, but also to regional ‘migrant boomtowns’. Here, internal migrants work primarily in the booming construction industry fuelled by investment in housing from international returnees.

Other links: adding return migration

Internal-then-international and international-then-internal are the two most obvious pathways linking the two forms of migration under examination, but other patterns are also evident, especially as multiple and mixed forms of migration and mobility become more common. Trajectory 5 – internal, then international, then internal again – is probably much more common than the limited research evidence to support it. Another important linkage occurs when internal and international migration take place simultaneously – from the same country, region or household. We shall discuss Albanian evidence on this presently, as well as comment on some of the possible factors which discriminate between internal and international migrants from the same place of origin.

A more complete refinement of the scheme portrayed in Figure 1 occurs when we add return migration, which produces another five trajectories to extend those outlined earlier.\(^8\) Pathway 6 is the simplest – a ‘U-turn’ back to the place of origin and departure. Pathway 7 is different: here the migrant left from Xa (e.g. rural southern Italy) but returns to Xb (e.g. industrial northern Italy) probably because the likelihood of employment is much greater there; Wiltshire (1979) calls this ‘J-turn’ migration. It could also be that, during the time that the migrant was abroad at Y, part of his or her kinship network internally migrated from Xa to Xb, thereby creating a favourable environment for the international migrant to return to Xb. Cases 8 and 9 are two alternative destinations of return where the emigration is preceded by an internal move. In path 8 the return is to the place of origin, not of departure; in path 9 the return is to the place the migrant emigrated from. In the latter of these two cases the migrant returns to the place which probably holds greatest utility in terms of employment (factory or service jobs) or of investment opportunities (in urban property or business). In the former pathway, the migrant is perhaps coming towards

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\(^8\) These return migration pathways are developed from the typologies of Bovenkerk (1974: 5) and Hernández Alvarez (1967: 21-28); see King (1978b) for discussion and summary of these.
the end of their working life and so is both a returnee and retiree, looking for a quiet life amongst kin and old friends, maybe linked to inherited or purchased rural property (see Cerase 1974 for a description of the 'return of retirement'). Finally, pathway 10 sees the returnee, an internal migrant before emigrating, return to a place which is neither the place of origin nor the place of internal migration and departure. This third place Xc, might be a coastal resort. Thus our hypothetical Italian migrant originates from a hill-village in the rugged interior of southern Italy, migrates for a spell to Rome or Milan, then emigrates to the UK (or Germany or wherever), and finally returns to a seaside town, perhaps not too far from the village of origin.

In the study by Hernández Alvarez (1967: 23-24) of Puerto Rican migration to the US, a questionnaire survey of returnees (n=307) who relocated to Puerto Rico during the early 1960s enabled a quantification of pathways 6-10 in Figure 1. In this case, Xa is likely to be rural Puerto Rico, and Xb the capital San Juan. The largest percentage (52.4) followed pathway 6, a return to origin with no internal migration. Path 7, where the migrants leave from Xa but return to Xb, comprised 21.2 per cent of the sample. This, Hernández Alvarez notes, consists of two sub paths: a direct return to Xb and a return to Xa followed by an internal migration to Xb. Another quite common path was 9: 20.5 per cent internally migrated (most likely to San Juan) prior to departure for the US, and then returned to the capital. The two remaining pathways, 8 (4.1 per cent) and 10 (1.9 per cent) were followed by few returnees.9

Another example of the interface between internal and international migration via return migration from abroad comes from Unger’s work on Greece (1981; 1986), based both on his analysis of census data for 1971 and on his primary research – a survey of 584 male returnees from West Germany interviewed in 1980. Census data reveal interesting aggregate and net patterns. For instance, Athens sent 7.3 per cent of all Greek emigrants to West Germany but received 11.5 per cent of the returnees; for Thessaloniki the respective figures were 7.4 and 12.8 per cent. By contrast, the northern highland region of Threspotia sent 13.5 per cent of the emigrants to Germany, but received only 6.6 per cent of returnees. Another calculation made by Unger is the

9 Hernández Alvarez is at pains to point out that this survey cannot be regarded as fully representative. However, Puerto Rican census data on place of birth, prior residence and current residence do validate the phenomenon whereby external migration to and return from the US contributes significantly to a rural-to-urban redistribution of the population within Puerto Rico. Whereas only 10 per cent of return migrants were born in Puerto Rico, 40 per cent were living there at the time of the 1960 census (Hernández Alvarez 1967: 22-23). It also needs to be pointed out, of course, that migration from Puerto Rico to the US is not true international migration. It is, however, long-distance migration from an island with a different cultural, linguistic and developmental set of characteristics from those of the large mainland destination territory (most Puerto Rican migration has been to New York).
‘remigration ratio’ – the ratio between return migrants and emigrants for any given district over the period 1970-77. Of the 52 Greek districts, only three – Athens, Thessaloniki and Photis (west of Athens) – recorded ratios over 100. The mean ratio at the national level was 54 for all emigration destinations and 66 for West Germany. Like Puerto Rico, the Greek case clearly demonstrates that return migration contributes to net internal rural-urban migration, especially to major cities. Finally, by interviewing returned migrants in three cities – Athens, Thessaloniki and Serres (a provincial city north-east of Thessaloniki) – Unger was able to separate three spatial pathways of emigration and urban-oriented return. Returnees to Athens are drawn not only from Athens itself, but also from those who internally migrated to Athens prior to emigration from all parts of Greece, and those who emigrated directly from other parts of Greece and returned to Athens. Thessaloniki’s return attraction is limited mainly to those who originated from the city and its surrounding large regions of Macedonia and Thrace. Thirdly, small cities such as Serres are only significant as return destinations for those who originated from that city and its surrounding local district. Table 1 enables the fine detail of these patterns to be teased out more carefully.

Finally, de Haas’s (2006: 576) work on Morocco reveals similar patterns of linked internal and international migration via return corresponding to pathway 7 of our diagram (Figure 1), i.e. international migrants originated from rural areas but settled in the regional capital and other regional towns upon their return.

**Factors differentiating internal migrants from emigrants**

Now we refocus our attention on the sending-country context and ask the question: what distinguishes international migrants (emigrants) from those who migrate internally? Research on Mexican migration provides one set of responses, although the picture is complicated by evidence, noted earlier, that many emigrants to the US are former internal migrants and that many families contain both internal and external migrants (cf. Lozano-Ascencio et al. 1999; Zabin and Hughes 1995). But this spatial division of household labour also reveals age/sex differences: with reference to Oaxacan migrant families in Baja California (northern Mexico) and California (USA), Zabin and Hughes (1995: 410-413) found that migrants in California were more likely to be males and older. Aggregate data revealed that, whilst only 2 per cent of Mexican-US immigrant farm workers were under 18, the percentage amongst
Oaxacan migrant farm workers in Baja was 32; the respective percentages of females in the two migrant populations were 19 and 50. Oaxacan migrant households allocate family members between Baja California and California in response to different work and wage structures, different child labour laws on either side of the border, and the dual social role of women as wage workers and primary providers of childcare. Finally, border crossing was regarded as physically and psychologically much more dangerous for women.

However, the special circumstances of this migration context must also be borne in mind. The expansion of labour-intensive export agriculture in Baja since the 1980s has turned the area into ‘a school for el Norte’ (Zabin and Hughes 1995: 413). Workers are attracted to Baja from southern Mexico by higher wages and regular work, but then after a few years many, especially men, cross the border where they can do the same work (but under more demanding work regimes) for much higher wages. Meanwhile, Baja provides employment security for other members of the migrant household, especially women and children, and cushions the cost of failure for US-bound migrants.

A different approach was used by Lindstrom and Lauser (2001) in their study of out-migration (internal and to the US) from the Mexican state of Zacatecas. These authors used quantitative modelling to examine the validity of the predictions of three migration behaviour models – neoclassical push-pull theory, the new economics of labour migration, and social network theories. Coefficients from the models are used to derive the relative likelihoods of internal vs. US migration for municipalities with different economic characteristics. Results confirm the relevance of all three theoretical standpoints. Good employment opportunities locally were significantly associated with lower out-migration both to the US and to other parts of Mexico, consistent with the neoclassical view. On the other hand, and supporting the ‘new economics’ paradigm, US migration was significantly higher from municipalities with abundant opportunities for small-scale investment. Thirdly, social networks were found both to facilitate migration and to deter competing types of migration (internal versus external). As for distinguishing between internal and international migration, the implications of this study are that emigration to and return from the US is a form of investment-oriented migration, whereas internal migration is a lower-risk strategy geared more towards household survival. Social networks are equally important for
internal and international migration; and each acts to screen out the probability of the other kind of migration.

Somewhat similar results are gleaned from del Rey Poveda’s (2007) three-way study of migration from rural Veracruz: to regional market towns, to the industrial estates along Mexico’s northern border, and to the US. He finds (2007: 305) that migrations to local markets and to the border are generated by precarious economic conditions in the places of origin, whereas the determinants of international migration relate to the capability to put this more expensive and demanding migration into practice. These differences are reflected in the individual risk factors derived for each type of migration by multinomial logistic regression. US migrants are overwhelmingly male, with more years of education; they have more agricultural property (as an indicator of family resources) and are more likely to have a family history of migration. Consistent with these factors, they are much less likely to be part of the ethnic indigenous population or to come from communal ejido villages. Some of these features are also characteristic of migration to the border towns, but to a less marked extent. For local migration, distinguishing factors are high population density in the township of origin and prior family connections to the destination place.

A final perspective from Mexico is provided by Stark and Taylor’s (1991) analysis of 61 randomly selected households in the Pátzcuaro district of Michoacán state. Their focus is on the role of relative deprivation within the rural community as a possible predictor of non-migration, internal migration, and migration to the US. At an absolute level, US migrants were more likely to be male, have greater household wealth (land, animals, machinery etc.), come from larger families (but not be household heads), and have kin already in the US, when compared to either internal movers or non-migrants. Internal migrants were often ‘intermediate’ in socio-economic and demographic characteristics between the other two groups, except for stronger kin links to internal destinations and prior experience of internal migration. So far, this is consistent with findings reported above.

Interestingly, in this study, however, internal migrants had on average more years of schooling (6.5) compared to US migrants (4.1); non-migrants had 3.9 years. This last characteristic is relevant in explaining the somewhat surprising outcome of Stark and Taylor’s analysis, namely that the households sorted themselves in terms of high returns to human capital yet high risk of increased relative deprivation (through low incomes) for internal migrants, and low returns to human capital (because of low-
skilled jobs offered to immigrants in the US) yet low risk of increased relative deprivation (through high remittances) for international migrants. In other words, ‘better-educated villagers are much more likely to migrate to (urban) destinations in Mexico, where returns to schooling are likely to be high, than to low-skill undocumented immigrant labour markets in the United States’ (1991: 1176). Stark and Taylor’s key empirical finding is that both absolute and relative deprivation are significant in explaining international migration, but they have no (direct) effects on internal migration behaviour. The authors conclude by pointing to an important policy outcome of what they term the ‘relative deprivation paradox of migration’: economic development that does not address intra-village income inequalities may lead to more not less international migration, even if overall incomes rise in a distribution-neutral way (1991: 1177).

How does this Mexican evidence stack up against findings from elsewhere in the world? This is difficult to say because comparative studies on the two forms of migration are so few. An early study from the Philippines (de Jong et al. 1983) compared intentions to migrate from Ilocos Norte province to Manila and to Hawaii; note, this concerned intentions, not actual migration. The authors used a value-expectation framework alongside more conventional conditioning variables such as household demographic and economic characteristics, family and friendship networks, and personality traits such as risk-taking orientation. Results indicated that, compared to a control sample of stayers, intending migrants had more financial, human and demographic capital (i.e. more money, more years of schooling, larger families), more kinship contacts in destination places, more frequent travel to Manila (also valid for those intending to move to Hawaii), and a more sophisticated ‘cognitive calculus’ of the costs, benefits and risks of moving. Moreover, ‘individually held expectations of attaining important values and goals … differentiate intended movers to Hawaii from intended movers to Manila … (Thus) the findings confirm the application of the general expectancy theory to not only the decision to move but also the decision where to move’ (1983: 479).

Drawing from a range of mainly Latin American studies, including his own work on Bolivian migration to Argentina, Balán (1988) makes the following generalisations about the differences between internal and international migration. Those who are better off tend to migrate further (i.e. abroad) while those with fewer resources tend to be limited to internal migration. The higher costs (and risks) of international
migration largely explain the types of selectivity involved – for instance with regard
to education and family contacts. Males are more predisposed to international
migration than females, especially when the migration is temporary. Internal
migration to cities shows a large presence of females. Interestingly, some of these
generalising statements echo Ravenstein’s laws of a century earlier.

Elsewhere in the literature, not all the bold statements about differentiating
internal from international migration stand up to empirical scrutiny. For instance
Kleiner et al., in their promisingly-titled but ultimately disappointing paper, state that
‘migration to another country is more irreversible than internal migration’ (1986: 313),
but the weight of evidence in the Mexican studies cited above, and from other
research, for example in southern Italy (King 1988), tends to suggest the opposite.

Integrating internal and international migration theory
Two early attempts to link internal and international migration within a single
theoretical-analytical framework are worthy of note. The first is Brinley Thomas’s
pioneering analysis of transatlantic migration from Britain in the nineteenth century,
which correlated overseas migration with internal migration in Britain (positing an
inverse correlation) and with alternating economic cycles in Britain and North
America (Thomas 1954). Briefly, when Britain boomed and America was
economically stagnant, domestic rural-to-urban migration in Britain was dominant;
and when the cycles were the other way round, international moves from Britain to
America were dominant. Thomas thus saw internal and international migrations as
alternative strategies depending on the intermeshing of long-wave economic cycles in
the two parts of the North Atlantic regional system. However, a major flaw in
Thomas’s analysis arose from the fact that much British migration to North America
originated not from rural areas, as Thomas hypothesised, but from cities. We look to
Baines (1986; 1994) for a more accurate analysis of the historical relations between
internal and international migrations in Britain, Europe and North America.

The second notable attempt to link internal and international migration within the
same framework is found in Zelinsky’s famous paper on ‘the hypothesis of the
mobility transition’ (1971). Zelinsky drew on 1950s and 1960s modernisation theory
and the notion of stages of migration to provide a logical framework for hypothesising
connections between internal and international migration (Pryor 1975). In Zelinsky’s
own words (1971: 221-222), ‘There are definite patterned regularities in the growth
of personal mobility through space-time during recent history, and these regularities comprise an essential component of the modernization process’ (emphasis in original). Zelinsky decomposed mobility into international migration and various internal moves – rural-rural, rural-urban, inter-urban and circulation – that varied systematically and sequentially through the five stages of the mobility cycle: see Table 2. Underpinning this descriptive model was the parallel analogy with the demographic transition; hence the supply of potential migrants, as generated by shifting patterns of fertility and mortality, was combined with a discourse of ‘modernisation’ and ‘development’ to produce a staged evolutionary model. This model essentially represented a post hoc interpretation of how migration and development trends have been historically sequenced and linked over the past couple of hundred years or so in Western Europe.

The strength of Zelinsky’s ‘hypothesis’ is that it combines different types of population movement – internal and external migration, and other mobility forms – into a single framework. But there are weaknesses in his approach and it has been widely critiqued (see for instance, Boyle et al. 1998: 60-61; Cadwallader 1993; Skeldon 1997: 31-37; Woods 1993); Zelinsky, in turn, has responded and refined some aspects of his model (1983; 1993). Amongst the key criticisms of Zelinsky’s model are the following (Skeldon 1997: 32-35). First there are factual errors, perhaps the most notable being his assumption of an immobile pre-modern society, with industrialisation and urbanisation then tearing peasants away from this static rural milieu. A second weakness was the implied parallelism between the mobility transition and the demographic transition. Although Zelinsky (1971: 229-231) demurred from expressing any causal direction in the links between the two, he never really demonstrated what the links actually were: how mobility might affect fertility and mortality, or the other way round, were never answered. Thirdly, the rooting of the mobility transition in ‘old-style’ modernisation and development theory was an obvious shortcoming. The path of global development – and of development studies – over the last 30-40 years has invalidated the teleological modernist notion that all societies are moving in a steady progression through the stages of development mapped out by the adoption of western-style technologies, norms and institutions. Boyle et al. (1998: 61) judged Zelinsky’s model to have considerable heuristic value but to be naively positivistic and a-political; for Woods (1993: 214) it was ‘a child of
its time … before geographers became far more critically aware of the political connotations of theory and model construction’.

Timing was particularly crucial since Zelinsky presented his mobility hypothesis at a crucial juncture – both from the point of view of migration processes (linked, *inter alia*, to the transition from fordism to post-fordism in advanced countries), and from the viewpoint of the theoretical debate. Most revealingly, in his ‘future super-advanced society’ (stage V, Table 2), he failed to anticipate an important change for which evidence was just about to appear – *counterurbanisation*, or the redistribution of population away from cities and large metropolitan areas in favour of rural regions and smaller towns.\(^{10}\) That people in the western world were no longer migrating predominantly towards metropolitan regions but heading in the opposite direction was a fundamentally new trend which, Zelinsky subsequently maintained (1983: 21), could not have been predicted.

On the theoretical front, Zelinsky acknowledged (1983: 22-25) that his assumption that the less developed countries would follow the migration stages of the developed countries, was fundamentally flawed. In fact he was quite brutally honest about this: ‘After careful reflection, I believe this initial impression, which I shared a few short years ago, is false and deceptive. In fact, I wish to advance the thesis that the observable facts suggest profound differences between the two sets of events [i.e. migration processes in less developed and advanced countries], differences that provoke fundamental theoretical quandaries’ (1983: 23). Zelinsky invoked dependency theory as part of his realisation that social and economic processes in the less developed countries, including migration, are contingent upon decisions made by governments and corporations based in the rich countries of what has become a highly interdependent world (1983: 25).

In other respects, however, Zelinsky was ahead of his time; his incorporation of migration *and* various forms of mobility in the same theoretical frame anticipated the ‘mobilities paradigm’ in the sociology of migration by thirty years (cf. Cresswell 2006; Hannam *et al.* 2006; Sheller and Urry 2006; Urry 2000).

\(^{10}\) There has been an extensive literature on counterurbanisation; for some key studies see Boyle and Halfacree (1998), Champion (1989), Fielding (1982), Geyer and Kontuly (1996), Vining and Kontuly (1978). Counterurbanisation is not purely a phenomenon of internal migration, but also exists in an international form. Two subtypes of international counteurbanisation can be mentioned – the settlement of retired British and other Northern Europeans in rural areas of continental Europe such as the Dordogne or Tuscany (see e.g. Buller and Hoggart 1994; King and Patterson 1998; King *et al.* 2000), and the return migration of international labour migrants from their industrial-urban workplaces to their rural villages of origin (e.g. Rodriguez and Egea 2006).
Roughly contemporary with Zelinsky’s (1983) reappraisal of his earlier theoretical statement, Pryor (1981) issued a call for the integration of internal and international migration theories, arguing particularly for the incorporation of the former into the latter. The aim of Pryor’s paper was not to present an overarching metatheory of migration – which both he and other authors regard as illusory (e.g. Castles 2007; Portes 1997; Massey et al. 1993; Zelinsky 1983; Zolberg 1989) – but rather to ‘explore the possibility of integrating aspects of existing theories and empirical findings in a new way’ (Pryor 1981: 110). To this end Pryor presented three conceptual sets which we have summarised in Table 3. First, there are five key questions which help to define and structure the building of theory. Second, Pryor identified seven dimensions of similarity along which common ground can be sought for integration of theoretical approaches between internal and international migration. He proposed that focusing on the behavioural interface and on systems analysis offered the best possibilities for theoretical unification, informed by historical and geographical comparisons of trends in different regions and countries over time (1981: 125). Third, Pryor recognised the reality that the study of migration had been fragmented along disciplinary lines – between sociologists, demographers, geographers, economists, anthropologists and psychologists, amongst others. This disciplinary compartmentalisation does not correspond to the fission between the internal and international migration traditions which, to some extent at least, replicates itself within several of these single disciplines.

How can we evaluate the significance of Pryor’s contribution? Writing more than a decade later, Salt and Kitching (1992: 161) reckoned that very little headway had been made since Pryor’s statement. Salt and Kitching endorsed Pryor’s search for integrating concepts, interdisciplinarity and a systems approach. Salt and Kitching’s own reference point is the UK labour market and they do not advance the theoretical debate except to suggest that ‘there is increasing scope for exploring the relevance of theories of internal migration for the better understanding of international migration and, conversely, that future studies of international migration may increasingly be able to illuminate the causes and consequences of internal migration’ (1992: 162).

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11 These have considerable similarity to those set out by White and Woods (1980: 1).
12 A similar point is made by Castles (2000: 19-21) although he mainly deals with the different approaches of sociologists and economists.
Pryor’s paper can perhaps best be regarded as a road map for theoretical integration, for he nowhere concretely or empirically demonstrated how the two migration systems might be theoretically linked. Moreover, the course of migration scholarship over the last 20 years or so has if anything deepened the clef between the two migration traditions. The ‘age of (international) migration’ (Castles and Miller 1993), the rise of the transnational approach since the early 1990s and the revival of studies of diasporic communities (Vertovec and Cohen 1999) clearly leave no room for internal migration except as a separate field of study. On the other hand, Pryor’s plea for interdisciplinarity has not gone unheeded: recent years have witnessed a growth in the mutual recognition of the value of conceptual and methodological commonality and pluralism across the social sciences, perhaps nowhere more so than in the study of migration. As Robin Cohen (1995: 8) memorably writes, ‘Those of us who have the migration bug recognize each other across disciplines and across nations, languages and cultures. We are part of the webbing that binds an emerging global society… We have found that our research is inadequate without moving to history and to other social science disciplines with which we had previously been unfamiliar … We recognize that the study of world migration connects biography with history and with lived social experience’. Fine words indeed; but much of this interdisciplinary collaboration and cross-feeding has been in the field of international migration, facilitated by the global growth of interest in the theme and accompanying national and international research funding opportunities. Internal migration has faded into the backcloth and surely needs to be rehabilitated, for both its quantitative and theoretical importance.

We close this section of the paper by considering three instances in which some kind of theoretical transfer or fusion seems appropriate. These are just some examples; no doubt there are many others.

Systems
The first is systems analysis. ‘System’ is one of the most widely, and loosely, used words in the migration lexicon; indeed we have used it ourselves several times thus far in our paper. Its genealogy in migration studies is, however, quite specific. Its first formal statement was in a pioneering paper by the Nigerian geographer Mabogunje (1970), where it was used to describe and model rural-urban migration in West Africa. The theoretical significance and potential of the Mabogunje systems model has been
repeated in many migration texts, especially those written by geographers (e.g. Boyle 
et al. 1998: 77-79; Skeldon 1997: 41-60; White and Woods 1980: 48-55; but see also 

There are five components to the Mabogunje model. The system is first defined by 
the *environment*, made up of four dimensions each corresponding to one side of the 
‘box’ containing the model – economic conditions, social conditions, transport and 
communications, and government policies. The second component is the *migrant*, 
encouraged by various push and pull forces to leave the rural village for the city. 
Thirdly there are *control subsystems* which calibrate the flows of migrants through 
the system. The rural control subsystem comprises such things as family and community, 
the urban control subsystem consists of opportunities for housing, employment and 
general assimilation into urban life. Fourthly, *adjustment mechanisms* operate in rural 
areas to cope with the loss of migrants and in urban areas to incorporate them. Finally 
there are *feedback loops* (positive or negative) which act to depress or increase the 
flow of migrants: feedback can be in the form of return migration, flows of 
information, remittances and other ‘demonstration effects’.

Despite the seminal status of Mabogunje’s paper, his systems model has had very 
limited practical application in subsequent empirical research (see Poot 1986 for an 
exception). Several reasons can be suggested for this (Boyle *et al.* 1998: 78): data 
shortages, rigidity of the formulation of boundaries around the system in comparison 
to the greater fluidity of migration in real life, and limited recognition of the social 
element of migration networks (cf. Boyd 1989) in favour of a more mechanistic 
approach based on ‘energy’ in the system. In abstract terms, the systems approach is 
appealing, for it emphasises the dynamics of links and flows, causes and effects, 
adjustments and feedback. As a ‘sophisticated descriptive method’, it allows for any 
number of interrelationships to be built in, but in the absence of really good data the 
model cannot be fully operationalised and therefore cannot generate real results, 
explanations or theory (Zelinsky 1983: 33). This problem is even more evident when 
we note how widely the term’s meaning has come to be stretched. In fact there is little 
consensus as to what constitutes a ‘migration systems approach’ (Fawcett 1989: 672). 
Frequent reference is made to the ‘global migration system’ (e.g. Kritz *et al.* 1992; 
Skeldon 1997: 42-59), to regional migration systems based on world areas such as 
Europe, North America, the Gulf, Southern Africa etc. (e.g. Castles and Miller 2003;
Salt 1989), and to more local-scale (but maybe globe-spanning) family and chain migration systems (e.g. Lever-Tracey and Holton 2001).

Nevertheless we find the systems approach attractive and can see obvious possibilities for its application to the study of international migration, as well as to the challenge of integrating internal and international migration through different system layers and linkages. Some progress in applying the systems model to international moves has already been made. White and Woods (1980: 49-55) apply what they call an ‘integrated systems approach’ to the case of post war labour migration into North-West Europe, based on a rather simple model of a structural context (economic and political integration, demand for labour etc.), areas of origin and destination, and flows of migrants. Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) also draw on Mabogunje’s ideas in their advocacy of a systems framework for studying international migration. Their migration systems comprise groups of countries linked by migration flows and exchanges whose importance is determined by their coherence and functionality. Such systems may be stable over time or, more likely, wax and wane, often rapidly, in response to political and economic changes. Kritz and Zlotnik also argue for the renewed importance of systems modelling in an era of enhanced mobility and global interdependence.

Pryor (1981: 122-123) describes some interesting work on Yugoslavian migration to, and return from, West Germany using a systems model based on 21 variables grouped into four subsystems:

- socialisation subsystem – education of parents, family size, level of development of area of origin, attachment to place of origin, presence of chain migration;
- institutional subsystem – qualifications held by migrant, knowledge of German, marital status, trade union membership, participation in self-management organisation in Yugoslavia;
- consumer rewards subsystem – consumer goods purchased, building of new home in Yugoslavia;
- regulatory variables – sex, age, length of stay in Germany, motive for return to Yugoslavia et.
Amongst the key findings from this research were that the level of development of the area of migrant origin was a significant factor affecting migrants’ subsequent social position and likelihood of return; but that returnees’ own interests did not necessarily coincide with those of the society of origin (Yugoslavia) or previous residence (Germany).

As a final example, Nijkamp and Voskuilen (1996) use a systems approach to develop an explanatory framework for recent migration flows in Europe. Like the other studies mentioned above, they pay homage to Mabogunje, but acknowledge a greater role for historical and social factors in patterning and maintaining migration flows. In their own words:

It is widely recognized that most international migration flows do not occur randomly but usually take place between countries that have close historical cultural or economic ties. It is noteworthy also that most recent immigration flows are strongly linked to earlier flows of immigrants. Family reunification is one of the main reasons for migration, while also refugees look for countries where adoption and local absorption is best possible. Therefore social networks explain nowadays an important part of the direction of international migration (1996: 7).

Their systems model adapts Mabogunje’s framework to the international context and, like its predecessor, has five components. Macro-structural conditions frame the system and lie outside the box of the model: politico-economic situation, population, transport and communications, and environment/quality of life are the four axes. Secondly are motives to move – economic motives (survival, wealth accumulation), social motives (status, social mobility), residential satisfaction (a ‘better place to live’), family and friendship networks, lifestyle preferences etc. Much of the motivation to migrate has to do with ‘value expectancy’ (cf. de Jong and Fawcett 1981). The third system component is destination choice. Whilst the various individual motives will determine where to move, these decisions will be affected by other system elements such as migration policies, social networks, economic conditions and historical and cultural linkages. Fourthly – and roughly equivalent to Mabogunje’s urban adjustment and control subsystems – there is the absorptive process in the country of destination (usually experienced at the city/region level): this is made up of issues to do with housing employment, socio-cultural integration etc. Finally, also à la Mabogunje, there are feedback loops – information flows and return migration.
These examples of applying systems analysis to international migration are drawn from the European context. Other important work should also be acknowledged, such as that on Asia (Fawcett and Arnold 1987) and on Latin America and the US (Portes and Bach 1985); both of these are pioneering systems studies.

In conclusion, migration systems theory holds great promise for the integration not only of different types of migration – internal, international, return etc. – but also for integrating a wide range of disciplines and paradigms.\(^\text{13}\) It is both flexible and, up to a point, disciplinarily and ideologically neutral (except for what some see as a positivistic tone). It can, however, in the international realm be linked to a political economy approach if the system demonstrates the relevance of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment and cultural ties (Castles 2000: 24; Castles and Miller 2003: 26-28).

**Integration**

Stephen Castles (2000: 15-16, 24-25) draws a fundamental distinction between the *process* of migration and its *effects* in terms of creating complex and multicultural societies. In systems analysis terms these two stages correspond to two distinct subsystems, although there are of course powerful and direct linkages from the former to the latter, and feedback loops from the latter to the former. In studies of international migration, especially those carried out within Europe and North America, there is a massive literature on immigrant integration (or, to use alternative terms, assimilation, acculturation or incorporation). The vastness and complexity of this literature defy effective summary. We react to this ‘impossible task’ by making one simple point: that much of this research on the integration of ‘foreign’ immigrants in their destination settings – usually cities – has a largely unexplored relevance to research on internal migration, especially rural-urban migration where such moves bring population groups together which have social, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and racial differences (or just some of these). It is a mistake to assume that internal migrants are necessarily more homogenous in terms of these characteristics than are international migrants: it is enough to think of the great migration of rural southern blacks to the burgeoning northern industrial cities of the US in the early decades of the last century to grasp this point. Even the rural-to-urban migrations which have

\(^{13}\) As yet, however, we know of no convincing systems study which explicitly does integrate internal and international migration.
characterised most European countries over the past 100-150 years brought rural folk face-to-face with an urban-industrial milieu that they found very strange and challenging, and often reacted to by living in regional-origin-based concentrations, and maintaining their own cultural traits, regional languages and dialects and links to their home regions. Much the same holds for internal migration situations in many developing countries in more recent decades.

What we do now is to pin-point some aspects and concepts of the integration/assimilation literature which appear to have relevance to the situation of internal migrants. We have in mind particularly those cases where the internal migration involves groups of people who are somehow ‘different’ from the setting in which they settle. In order not to proliferate references, we draw our ideas from recent overviews (Asselin et al. 2006; Bastos et al. 2006; Bauböck et al. 2006; Bommes and Kolb 2006; Castles et al. 2002; Heckmann 2005) rather than citing a lot of primary literature.

The integration process is commonly divided into a number of spheres – economic, social, cultural, political and spatial (Engbersen 2003). Heckmann (2005: 13-15) reorganises these into:

- structural integration – the acquisition of rights and status within the core institutions of the host society, particularly access to employment, housing, education, health services, and political and citizenship rights;
- cultural integration (or acculturation) – refers to the cognitive, behavioural and attitudinal change of immigrants and their descendants in conformity to the norms of the host society;
- interactive integration – social intercourse, friendship, marriage and membership of various organisations;
- identificational integration – shows itself in feelings of belonging, expressed in terms of allegiance to ethnic, regional, local and national identity.

Heckmann (2005: 15) then defines integration in the following terms:

… a long-lasting process of inclusion and acceptance of migrants in the core institutions, relations and statuses of the receiving society. For the migrants integration refers to a process of learning a new culture, an acquisition of rights, access to positions and statuses, a building of personal relations to members of the receiving society and a formation of
feelings of belonging and identification towards the immigration society. Integration is an interactive process between migrants and the receiving society, in which, however, the receiving society has much more power and prestige.

This definition is very much a mainstream or conventional view. It connotes both a normative condition which is somehow to be expected or desired, and a pathway towards that norm. Castles et al. (2002: 112-115) take a more deconstructionist stance. They point out that integration is a very contested term, and open to a variety of definitions and interpretations. Moreover it is a two-way process, requiring adaptation on the part of both the immigrant and the host society. They also pose the question: ‘Integration into what? Are we referring to an existing ethnic minority, a local community, a social group, or [the national] society?’ Of course the host society is not homogenous; it is structured and stratified in various ways, and it also has marginalised elements such as subcultures of poverty and welfare dependency, into which some immigrants may fall, thereby creating a situation of non-belonging or social exclusion from the wider society. This reminds us of Portes and Zhou’s (1993) concept of segmented assimilation, mentioned earlier.

Heckmann acknowledges in his definition, but does not question, the hegemonic role of the host society. Castles et al. point out that in an open democratic society people have quite different lifestyles and values and hence different ideas about what constitutes the norm for that society or their participation in it. ‘In a multicultural society marked by differences in culture, religion, class and social behaviour, there cannot be just one mode of integration’, they write (2002: 114). These authors then go on to suggest that inclusion might be a more neutral and appropriate term.

All these debates – and here we are doing no more than picking at the surface – are commonly played out in the context of immigration, typically of poor immigrants into the urban, industrialised or post-industrial societies of ‘the West’. But, if we read back over these definitions and frameworks, and change our mind-set from one of (foreign) immigration and national host society (in Europe, North America, Japan etc.) to one of internal migrants arriving in the cities of, say, Asia or Latin America, then the issues remain pretty much the same.

Let us return to the ‘spheres of integration’ framework, and draw some parallels between the international and internal dimensions of these fields.
Studies of economic integration have been rather numerous and have focused on the labour market (the kind of jobs immigrants seek and get) and, more narrowly, on ethnic entrepreneurship (Bommes and Kolb 2006). Some models of work migration – especially those relying on comparative wage and unemployment levels, including income and job expectations – rely on frameworks which have been developed with reference to internal migration in developing countries (cf. Todaro 1976). However, theories of dual and segmented labour markets – where foreign immigrants can only enter certain job sectors within the structurally inferior secondary labour market due to various barriers erected around the primary labour market by host-society market processes and prejudices – have a largely unrecognised relevance to studies of internal migration (see Piore 1979 for the classic study). Entrepreneurship amongst immigrants rests on a platform of research, especially in the US, into the ‘ethnic economy’ whereby migrant businesses are established in market niches relying on strong ethnic social capital. There is a burgeoning literature on the ethnic business phenomenon, written from a number of theoretical perspectives, although sociological and anthropological accounts tend to prevail over economic analyses. Classic studies include New York’s Chinatown (Zhou 1992) and Koreans in Los Angeles (Light and Bonacich 1988); others take a more comparative approach (Kloosterman and Rath 2003; Rath 2002). Once again our point is very simple: surely some internal migrants form entrepreneurial niches which can be identified and studied using similar theoretical frameworks and empirical methods?14

The meaning of social integration is often widened to be coterminous with integration as a whole, i.e. comprising economic, political and cultural aspects. Here, partly following Asselin et al. (2006), we narrow the definition to include key structural integration dimensions such as housing, health and education as well as interaction variables such as friendship patterns, intermarriage and memberships of voluntary organisations. Given that much of the research on social integration thus defined is set within an urban context, tracing its lineage from the Chicago School and debates on assimilation, the ‘melting pot’ and its variants (see Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Gordon 1964; Park 1928 for some key studies), the parallels with internal, rural-urban migration are potentially close, although rarely drawn out in comparative

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14 One example: in Rome it is well-known that the lucrative business of selling drinks and snacks from mobile vans stationed at key points all over the city such as parks and tourist sites is in the hands of internal migrants from the Abruzzo region, yet the origin and mechanics of this regional business specialisation have never been explored.
studies. In practice, the socio-spatial integration pathways beaten in earlier times by internal migrants in major European cities are often followed at a later stage by international migrants – as studies of Athens have shown (Iosifides and King 1998; Leontidou 1990).

The spatial dimension of integration comes out more strongly in the now-long tradition of research by geographers and urban sociologists into residential segregation, much of which is quite technical and measurement-orientated. There is also a strong racialist imprint within this research, linked partly to the legacy of ‘the ghetto’ but also focusing on the ‘visibility’ of populations which are, to a greater or lesser extent, segregated. The trope of race comes out quite strongly, for instance, in the comparative segregation studies collected by Huttman et al. (1991) on Western Europe and United States, where the differential migration histories of blacks in American cities and immigrants in European cities fades into the background.

About political integration there is perhaps less to be said, given that the political participation and citizenship rights of international migrants are likely to be different from those of internal migrants. On the other hand, long-distance, rural-to-urban migrants moving, let us imagine, from interior China to coastal industrial cities, or from the Latin American countryside to capital cities, or from eastern Turkey to the gecekondus of Istanbul or Ankara, are all likely to be (or to feel) excluded from participation in the political life of the city or of the district or municipality, at least for a time. And studies of political transnationalism which focus on migrants’ political activities both ‘here’ (in the host society) and ‘there’ (in the origin country) have their parallel in the differential political activities exercised by internal migrants in their places of origin and destination – typically villages and small towns, and big cities respectively.

The sense in which migrants (internal or international) feel, or are made to feel, excluded from the life of the city links to the final sphere of integration, the cultural one, which relates most closely to Heckmann’s identificational integration. Common dimensions of cultural integration in studies of international migration are language and religion (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006). These are less likely to be relevant in

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15 In China the hukou or household registration system, whereby rights are tied to ‘official’ residence, has created, through internal migration, a vast ‘floating population’ that cannot access the normal housing, education and healthcare rights associated with urban citizenship (Li 2004: 681). Alexander and Chan (2004) liken the hukou system to South African apartheid. Meanwhile, in communist-era Albania, internal movements were highly regulated by the regime in an effort to fix the rural population in situ (Sjöberg 1994).
the case of internal migration but are by no means rare – think of migrants with
different languages and religions moving within former Yugoslavia, or Andalusians in
Barcelona. The point we would make here is that studies of interethnic relations and
multiculturalism should not be restricted to immigrant groups of different national
origins.\(^\text{16}\)

**Migration and development**

The relationship between migration and development, especially from the perspective
of less-developed sending countries, has recently become the focus of a fast-growing
literature (for a few key overview studies see Ammassari and Black 2001; Lucas 2005;
Skeldon 1997; Van Hear and Nyberg Sørensen 2003). As a result of this literature on
what is often called the ‘migration-development nexus’, international migration is
now widely viewed as having the potential to contribute to development and poverty
alleviation. Many governments and development agencies are seeking ways to
maximise the benefits of migration, e.g. through remittances and return migration, and
minimise its costs (e.g. brain drain). Yet the focus of both scholars and policy-makers
has tended to be almost exclusively on the relationship between (under)development
and *international* migration, overlooking the fact that, in most developing countries,
*internal* migration is the quantitatively more important phenomenon. The Chinese
government is one of the few to recognise the positive relationship between
development and internal migration: they observe that migration reduces the pressure
on rural land, provides labour for manufacturing industry and services, and according
to one estimate, contributes annually 16 per cent to China’s GDP growth (quoted in
de Wind and Holdaway 2005: 3).

Three generalisations and agendas for further research can be suggested within the
nexus linking (under) development on one side, and internal and international
migration on the other side.\(^\text{17}\)

The first arises out of the critique of Zelinsky’s migration model. As we saw
earlier, Zelinsky’s mobility transition hypothesis, for all its shortcomings, can be

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\(^\text{16}\) Indeed, if we follow Fielding (1992) in his ‘culturalist’ reading of migration’s deeper meanings (migration as
freedom, as joining in or opting out, as rupture, as success or failure etc.), the distinctions between internal and
international origins and destinations blur and fade into the background.

\(^\text{17}\) These generalised questions stand alongside three broader theoretical questions about the migration-
development nexus: Does (under)development cause migration? Does migration cause (under)development? Or
are the two related in some kind of symbiotic or recursive relationship which might be called the migration-
development-migration nexus? (Sriskandarajah 2005: 1). In fact, these questions become six when we place
‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as alternative dependent or independent variables.
regarded as a bold historical model relating together trends in urbanisation and economic development, on the one hand, with both internal and international migration on the other. It is, essentially, a post hoc explanatory model of how development and migration interfaced in the now-developed countries. The sequence may be very different for developing countries. But no comparable overarching theoretical statement has yet been made about the sequenced interaction between development and internal and international migration in the developing world, although Adepoju (1998), Deshingkar (2005; 2006) and Skeldon (1997; 2008) have taken some steps along this path. For instance, in the African context Adepoju asks whether rural-urban migration acts as an alternative to international migration, and suggests that, as Africa develops through internal migration, there may be less pressure for international migration. This is a question of enormous policy relevance (1998: 393).

So, as regards the first agenda, perhaps the key question to address is: to what extent is development in poor regions of the world bound up with the combined (or substitutable) effects of the two types of migration on individuals, communities and countries? Of course, this is not a simple or easy question. Quite apart from the direction of causality between migration and (under)development, we are dealing with combinations versus alternatives, three scales of analysis, time-bound effects of past and present and short and long term, as well as obvious differences between countries/continents. As yet, as we have seen, studies of migration within the developing world are largely split between the two non-conversing domains of internal and international migration, thereby yielding a partial insight into the complex livelihoods of migrants and their communities.

The second agenda question has already been mentioned above in our discussion of migration selectivity factors. The literature supports the generalisation that international migration normally has a much higher cost than internal migration (Massey et al. 1993: 461). Distances are greater, as are barriers to entry, especially if the migrant has no legal right to cross the border and to work. These costs are not just financial but also human and psychological – the costs of leaving and adapting to a new culture, of long-term separation from family and friends, of evading arrest etc. This affects networks, which in some cases are much stronger – precisely because they need to be – for international than for internal migration (Stark and Taylor 1991). This higher cost is however balanced by the expectation that earnings abroad will be
higher, not only to justify and cover these costs, but also to attain higher goals. For instance, remittances from abroad are usually higher than internal remittances and their impact might also be more important. In his study of migration in Morocco de Haas (2006: 569-572) found that the impact of international remittances was by far more important at the family and the community level than that from remittances sent by internal migrants. However, this is not always the case. Although internal remittances are not measured as often and as systematically as international transfers, at times they can have a greater impact on communities of origin, as noted in some parts of Asia (Deshingkar 2005; 2006). Comparative studies of internal and international remittances have yet to be made (although see for an exception Castaldo and Reilly 2007 in the context of Albanian migration). Widening the comparison to social remittances (Levitt 1998) – norms and behaviours communicated back to migrant origin areas, which might include views on gender and family size, or on consumer patterns – creates further research challenges in monitoring these ‘invisible’ flows from different social and cultural fields within the country and abroad.

The third generalisation concerns the way in which the internal vs. international distinction maps on to propensity to return. The cost logic expressed above leads to the conclusion that a move abroad is more likely to be long-term or irreversible because of the greater length of time needed to recuperate the higher expenses of migrating internationally (Kleiner et al. 1986: 313). Distances and costs of return may also be greater. Our feeling is that this need not always be the case; in fact, quite the reverse. Actually, much depends on the national contexts. Circular migration, common in Africa, self-evidently involves short-term absences in cities, mines or plantations and repeated returns to villages or tribal homelands (Gould and Prothero 1975). Our Albanian evidence, presented in more detail immediately below, suggests that migration to Greece and Italy is more likely to be temporary than rural-urban migration within Albania, which seems projected along a pathway of no return. On the other hand, Albanian emigration overseas to North America consists mostly of permanent settlement.

The case of Albania
In this final section of the paper we present some data on Albania, a country where there has been – relative to the size of the country’s population (a little over 3 million) – massive external and internal migration since 1990. During the 45 years of the
communist era, emigration was banned (in fact it was regarded as an act of treason, with severe punishments), whilst internal mobility was also very tightly controlled by the state. Small wonder, then, that after 1990 both emigration and internal migration ‘exploded’, although it has been emigration, chiefly to neighbouring Greece and Italy, which has gained the greater attention from scholars.

This part of the paper is in four subsections. First we briefly set the scene by describing the chronology and scale of the two types of migration and the factors driving them. Second, we present some quantitative data derived mainly from the 2001 Census and the 1989-2001 intercensal period in order to explore differential spatial patterns of internal and external migration. Thirdly we move down to the individual family level to discuss some typical examples of the intertwining of internal and external migration paths as part of family and household economic strategies. Fourthly, we draw out lessons from the Albanian evidence.

**Chronology and numbers**

The long communist interlude of non-migration abroad and of tightly regulated and limited internal migration separated two periods of wide-ranging mobility. During the Ottoman period Albanians moved to many parts of the frontier-free Empire as soldiers, imperial personnel and workers. Albania’s poor agro-pastoral economy, a reflection of its predominantly mountainous terrain, was the main push factor for this migration, much of which was male and temporary. Somewhat later, at the very end of the nineteenth century and during the early decades of the twentieth, Albanians emigrated to the United States, as part of the wider transatlantic mass migration from southern and south-eastern Europe at that time. This migration was mainly from southern Albania (King and Vullnetari 2003: 17-22).

Emigration ceased during the early communist years. Internal movements were centrally planned by the regime. Strict regulations were imposed as to where people could live and what work they would do. Internal migration occurred largely in function of economic plans – industrialisation, exploitation of minerals, agricultural reforms and draining of swampy land (Borchert 1975). According to Sjöberg (1992) the policy of the Albanian government after 1959 was one of rural retention and zero urban growth, as a result of which Albania’s urban population, as a proportion of total

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18 Another example of the blurring of internal and international migration!
population, stagnated over ensuing decades (it was 30.9 per cent in 1960, 35.5 per cent in 1989). However, Sjöberg also draws attention to internal population relocation which to some extent subverted official plans. He calls this ‘diverted migration’ leading to ‘pseudo-urbanisation’ (1992: 10-11). Migrants aiming to move to the capital, Tirana, were allowed to settle in nearby rural areas (it was easier to get a permit to migrate inter-rurally), leading to the formation of extra-urban settlements which were the blueprint for Tirana’s massive urban expansion in the post-communist years.

The collapse of the communist regime heralded what can only be described as a migration frenzy. Apart from the older generations, it seemed that everybody wanted to leave, or was talking about emigrating. But the mass departures of the early 1990s, across the Otranto Strait to southern Italy and over the southern mountains to Greece, were driven not by mere curiosity to see the outside world and rectify the injustice of forbidden emigration over the previous four decades. They were underpinned by extreme political instability and economic meltdown. Factories and mines closed, cooperatives and state farms were chaotically divided up, and irrigation systems were abandoned or laid to waste. In short, an entire pre-existing economic apparatus and social infrastructure, albeit inefficient in many ways, was swept away, but nothing put in its place. Emigration was seen as the only route to survival.

The scale of emigration in the early 1990s is somewhat conjectural. It is known that 25,000 ‘boat-migrants’ landed on the Apulian shore in March 1991 and were accepted as refugees; and another 20,000 followed in August of that year, most of whom were repatriated by the Italian authorities. But the larger-scale exodus across the mountain-paths into Greece was unquantifiable, partly because a lot of this movement was (and continued to be) back and forth; some estimates suggest that 200,000, even 300,000 Albanians entered Greece during 1991-93 (King 2003: 296-297; King and Vullnetari 2003: 4, 6). Later in the 1990s, regularisations of undocumented immigrants in Italy (in 1995 and 1998) and in Greece (1998), the 2001 round of censuses in these two countries, and the 1989-2001 intercensal migration residual calculated from the two Albanian censuses, all helped to give a more accurate picture of the size and distribution of the emigration. These different sources were not entirely consistent, but the broad scale of the migratory loss became clear.

The 1989-2001 intercensal calculation revealed a net migration of 600,000, mostly young adults aged 18-35, two-thirds of them males (INSTAT 2002: 19, 30). However,
this excluded migrants who had been abroad for less than one year, as well as births to migrants which would have accrued to the census total had those individuals not migrated. Other estimates were somewhat higher: 800,000 from Barjaba (2000) and more than 1 million from the Government of Albania (2005) based on cross-checking with destination-country records. This latter compilation comprises 600,000 Albanians in Greece, 250,000 in Italy, 100,000 in the US (which probably includes some ‘pre-communist’ migrants) and 50,000 in the UK.

Given the disorderly nature of the Albanian exodus, there are no reliable data on the annual variation in emigration since it started in 1991. Emigration has been continuous since then but with likely peaks in 1991-92, as noted above, 1997 (when the collapse of a series of pyramid saving scams bankrupted a large share of the Albanian population), and 1999 (the Kosovo refugee crisis, which also put severe strains on the Albanian economy and society). There is an ongoing debate on the scale of return migration. Some return has obviously taken place as a result of forced repatriations by the Greek and Italian authorities, and reflecting the to-and-fro nature of a lot of the Albanian migration to Greece. Large-scale return appears not yet to have taken place, although some studies suggest that it is starting (see Labrianidis and Hatziprokopiou 2005; Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006; Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2004).

There has also been a boom in internal migration since 1990; the extent to which this is functionally related to international migration will be explored presently. The scale of internal migration 1989-2001 depends on the size of the geo-statistical units used to record it. Between the three macro-regions of Albania (North, Centre-Coast and South) it was 182,600; between the 12 prefectures it was 252,700; and between the 36 districts it was 355,000 (Carletto et al. 2004: 19; INSTAT 2004: 12-13). This suggests that around twice as many people migrated internationally between 1989 and 2001 as moved internally across a district border. This, it must be acknowledged, is a rather crude comparison as it takes no notice of, or at least fails to accurately record, return and multiple moves such as emigrants who leave and return within the intercensal period, or those who emigrate from one district and return to another, or who move internally more than once between different districts. Moreover, intra-district moves, for instance from rural villages to the district capital, are missed.19

19 If the geo-grid is reduced to the mesh of Albania’s 374 communes (rural) and municipalities (urban), the number of people who changed residence between 1992 and 2001 is 1,356,750, according to Bërxholi and Doka (2003: 68). This puts internal relocation on a par with emigration, but raises the question of whether local-scale residential change can be regarded as migration.
Spatial patterns of internal and international migration

Based on district-level data, Figure 2 shows that there are three distinct population regions in Albania: the North, the Centre-Coast, and the South. Both the North and the South are composed almost entirely of hills and mountains; the triangular Centre-Coast region contains most of the country’s flatter land as well as the two most economically dynamic cities, the capital Tirana and the main port and seaside resort city of Durrës.

The Centre-Coast has both the highest population density (Figure 2a) and is the only region of population increase during 1989-2001 (Figure 2b). District-level population change shows some very wide contrasts, ranging from +41.2 per cent in Tirana to -54.7 per cent in Delvinë (in the far south). Although there are regional differences in birth-rate (higher in northern districts), these variations are not dramatic (Bërxholi et al. 2003: 44-45); by far the major contribution to population change is migration. Figure 2c maps one aspect of this migration impact – the share of the population enumerated in 1989 who were no longer resident in the same district (due to death, internal migration or emigration) in 2001 (INSTAT 2002: 34). Carletto et al. (2004) call this the ‘expulsion index’. Once again, some extreme values were recorded, above 50 per cent and even 60 per cent, in far-northern and far-southern districts. Mortality had a relatively minor role, accounting for less than 7 per cent of overall population loss and this figure did not vary very much spatially. The bulk of the loss was due to a combination of internal and international migration.

Interpretation of these results by INSTAT (2002: 33-34) and by other scholars (King 2004: 44-45; King and Vullnetari 2003: 43-45; Zezza et al. 2005: 182-185) identified three type-of-migration regions corresponding to the macro-regions mentioned above:

- In the North, high population losses were due mainly to internal out-migration, which was twice as important as emigration in accounting for population loss.
- In the Centre-Coast region, the much lower losses due to out-movement were overwhelmingly to abroad; few people migrated internally out from this core region; indeed as we shall see soon, this is the main recipient region for internal migration.
In the South, where the highest losses of population occurred, these were mainly abroad, especially to neighbouring Greece, exceeding by three times the outflow internally.

Although the Albanian census of 2001 did not spatially disaggregate internal from international migration, subsequent analyses of the unpublished data did achieve this separation at district level (Bërxholi et al. 2003: 70, 72; Zezza et al. 2005: 186). Figure 3 compares the two distributions, clearly demonstrating that internal migration (3a) is spatially concentrated in northern and especially north-eastern districts, with a secondary concentration in the centre-south, whilst external migration (3b) derives largely from the southern half of the country and some coastal districts facing Italy. However, the spatial separation is far from absolute, since there are some districts which score high on both maps, for instance Tropojë in the far North and Korçë and Kolonjë in the south-east. Figure 3c is a schematic attempt to map the main internal and international flows, derived from an intuitive scrutiny of various data sources. It allows us to highlight the three migrations which have dominated Albania since 1990: the internal flow from the North to Tirana; the migration to Italy which mainly originates from the coastal districts; and the cross-border migration to Greece which originates especially from the South.20

Agorastakis and Sidiropoulos (2007: 480) posit a temporal sequence between the two types of migration: they suggest that, as the international flows started to decline since the late 1990s (partly because of increasingly effective anti-immigration controls put in place by Italy and Greece), so the significance of internal mobility became more apparent. A further rationale for this, to be discussed in the next subsection, is the way that many Albanian families used the initial emigration of some of their members to finance an internal relocation from a rural to an urban site, the latter offering improved opportunities for modern housing, a better quality of life, employment and business ventures. On the other hand, there is also evidence that

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20 Carletto et al. (2006) and Stampini et al. (2005) use data from the representative-sample Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey (ALSMS) to differentiate the characteristics of emigration to Italy from that to Greece, as well as between temporary and permanent migration. Temporary migrants are overwhelmingly male (91 per cent), and are more likely to come from the poorer parts of Albania (rural, highland districts), to have lower levels of education, and to go to Greece. By contrast, permanent emigrants are more likely to go to Italy, to be more educated and to come from urban, coastal districts; moreover 35 per cent of them are female. Changes over time in the profile of emigrants include an increasing share of females, a greater involvement of poorer families in migration, and a spread of origins to all parts of the country. These statistical associations are drawn from the ‘migration modules’ of the 2002 and 2003 rounds of the ALSMS.
patterns of inter-district rural-urban migration were broadly continuous with those which took place, albeit at a much reduced scale, before 1990 (Sjöberg 1989).

Case studies
The following three case-histories of family-centred migration are drawn from recent fieldwork in a group of villages in south-eastern Albania. The case studies are strategically chosen as typical of the different ways in which family migration strategies entwine internal and international moves to achieve a common or at least partially shared goal, which generally involves external migration as a route to internal relocation away from the village and towards a major town. Thus, in the Albanian experience, the most common sequence is international migration leading to a subsequent internal migration within Albania, but not via any of the simple paths depicted in Figure 1. Different family members are involved, and their individualised and sometimes linked paths only make sense when viewed through the lens of the whole multi-generational family.

On the migration-path diagrams which illustrate these three cases, we divide up the locations of migration into six spaces: the village, the regional city Korçë, the national capital Tirana, and the three main destination countries for migrants from this part of Albania – Greece, Italy and the US. Plotted against a timeline, each individual’s migration path is traced through these spaces, with key events and intersections along the way. The interviews and biographies were collected in 2005 and 2006.

First comes the case of Ledia and her family (Figure 4). Ledia was born in the village in 1972, as were her siblings, Blendi (1975) and Valbona (1978). She attended secondary school in a larger, neighbouring village and in 1990 moved to Tirana for four years to attend the Higher Institute for Agriculture. Upon graduating she returned to her home in the village and to a teaching job in the secondary school where she herself had been a pupil. After eight years, in 2002 she moved again to Tirana, this time to live with her younger sister Valbona, who had just graduated from the University of Tirana in Fine Art. Ledia continued her teaching career in Tirana, first in a temporary post in a private school, then on a more secure footing in a state school.

21 This fieldwork is part of Vullnetari’s DPhil in Migration Studies at Sussex, soon to be submitted.
22 This graphical methodology takes its inspiration from Hägerstrand’s time geography (see Hägerstrand 1978; 1982) and from recent applications of this work by Liversage (2005) and Carling (2007).
Valbona, although six years Ledia’s junior, had been the first to settle definitively in Tirana since she had taken a job there to finance her studies and so lived in the city all year round instead of returning to the village outside term-time. After Valbona completed her degree she found a job in a graphic design studio and has been living in Tirana ever since, moving out of the subsidised students’ accommodation into her own rented flat shared with Ledia.

Blendi, the middle sibling, emigrated to Greece aged 18 as soon as he had finished secondary school in 1993. He has worked in Greece ever since, doing a variety of jobs mainly to do with construction. Since the 1998 Greek regularisation he has had a two-year renewable stay permit, like most Albanians in Greece nowadays. From his savings from working in Greece, Blendi has been able to buy a house in Tirana; the purchase has just been completed, and his sisters have moved in. He plans to return to live in Tirana, where the entire family, including his parents, who are both in their late 50s, will regroup; but he has no clear idea when this will be.

However, although this newly-acquired dwelling in Tirana will be the family home, it is expected that his sisters, when they get married, will move in with their respective husbands, according to the virilocal Albanian custom. The Tirana house will be the home of Blendi and his future wife and children, and his parents. This reflects the ‘duty’ in Albania of the (youngest) son to care for the parents in their old age.

Meanwhile, the parents still live and work in the village; they have not yet reached retirement age and so do not qualify for the (meagre) state pension. They live from a combination of semi-subsistence farming and remittances from their son. When the family regrouping in Tirana eventually takes place, the parents plan to alternate winters in the city with summers in the village. This is a pattern followed by many village elders whose children have migrated to Tirana; it also makes climatic sense since summers in Tirana are very hot and winters in the village very cold with frequent snow. It is interesting that the mother is keener to follow her children to Tirana than the father is.

Summing up, the family is split by migration in three locations: the village, Tirana and Athens. The game plan is to unite them all in Tirana when the brother returns-migrates from Greece.

Next are Qemal and Nevrez, born 1933 and 1940 respectively (Figure 5). They live alone in the village since both their children have emigrated. Their son Skënder
(born 1962) now lives in Milan with his wife and two young children, aged 8 and 4. Their daughter Leta (born 1966) lives with her husband and two children (aged 14 and 10) in the United States. Let us follow each of these two adult children in turn.

Skënder lived in the village until he was 28, except for two years away on army service. He first tried to go to Italy by boat in March 1991, but the boat was intercepted and returned. Back in the village, he set off with a group of friends and walked over the mountains to Greece. He stayed there three years as an undocumented migrant, making occasional visits home, always clandestinely over the mountains. With the money he earned in Greece he bought a ‘people-carrier’ car and started a small business transporting people from the border crossing to various destinations in Albania and Kosovo. During these years (the mid-1990s) border traffic was quite intense due to the to-and-fro nature of migration from Albania to Greece.

At this point the family migration story gets more complicated! Some relatives of the family had moved to Tirana in 1992 and bought a piece of land on the edge of the city to build their own house. After Skënder returned from Greece the family decided to buy a plot of land near their relatives’ plot in order to build a house there too. However the money at their disposal at that time was only enough for the land and the foundations. Skënder was working with his taxi but his earnings were not enough to progress the house beyond the ground floor. The taxi trade was falling off due to tighter border controls and the traffic police were demanding too many bribes. Meantime, in 1996 he got married to a woman from a neighbouring village, and they had a son a year later. In 2000 Skënder moved with his family to Milan; a daughter was born there soon after. The decision to move to Italy was partly influenced by his wife’s two brothers who were already in Milan and told him how much better than Greece Italy was. Skënder worked in construction whilst his wife looked after the children and did occasional paid cleaning work. However, they did not have proper papers, which prevented them from returning to Albania to visit Qemal and Nevrez. Only in 2004 did they manage to get their papers in order, and finally were able to make a return visit; Qemal and Nevrez saw their four-year-old granddaughter for the first time.

Skënder and his family are now settled in Milan and are content with their situation. With the earnings from Italy they have been able to complete the house in Tirana, adding the second floor. Their plan is to return there at some stage in the future, bringing up their parents from the village and thereby fulfilling the son’s duty
of care to his parents. For the time being Qemal and Nevrez continue to live in the village and the Tirana house is rented out, generating 20,000 Lek (€170) a month.

However, an eventual reunion in Tirana is only one end-game open to this family; another lies along the migration path of their daughter. Leta married a man from Korçë in 1990 and lived in that city until 2003 when, together with her family (husband and two children), she migrated to the US under the Green Card lottery system. Their economic situation in Korçë had been precarious, but has improved dramatically in America.

Qemal and Nevrez have applied for a visa to go to the US to visit Leta and her family but were unsuccessful as their daughter has to be resident there longer. Although they just want to go and visit initially, they may decide to move there long-term if they like it. In terms of Albanian family traditions, this is feasible because their son-in-law’s parents, who would normally take precedence, are dead. Leta’s husband’s only surviving close relative is his brother, who also lives in America with his family. Once Leta has been in the US for five years, she can apply for citizenship and then for family entry for her parents. They cannot achieve family reunification with their son (the normal Albanian pattern) because Italian law does not permit elderly parents to join their migrant children in this way, and in any case the Milan flat is too small.

Our final case is Ibrahim’s family (Figure 6). Ibrahim (born 1944) and his wife (1948) moved from their village to Korçë in 1993, a move which was connected to the migration paths and marriage patterns of their children. They have three: two married daughters (born 1973, 1975), one living in Athens, the other in Florida, and an unmarried son, the youngest (born 1980).

The elder daughter married a man from Korçë and went to live with her husband’s parents there in 1993; a daughter was born in 1994. Her husband had been migrating back and forth to Greece and continued this after the marriage, leaving his wife and daughter in Korçë. In 1997 the husband took his wife and daughter to live in Athens, where they have lived ever since, adding a son to their family in 2000. He works in a cosmetics factory (he used to work in construction, but he had an accident and now cannot do heavy manual labour), and she does domestic care work with elderly Athenians. They have recently bought a large apartment in Korçë.

The younger daughter also married a man from Korçë (in 2000) and straight after moved to Florida on a lottery visa; their daughter was born there in 2002. They both
work for a local supermarket, he as a truck driver, she stacking shelves. These are not well-paid jobs by American standards, and besides, they have to pay childcare for their daughter so her mother can work. They plan to bring her husband’s parents over to do the childcare, but this has to wait until she and her husband get US citizenship.

The son lived with his parents, first in the village and then in Korçë, until 2001. In Albania he worked as a driver taking people to and from the customs point at the Greek border, but earnings were low. He moved to Athens in 2001, where he works in construction and lives with his sister and her family.

The flat that Ibrahim bought in Korçë in 1993 was financed with money from his father-in-law who had been an exile in America for a long time. In the future, Ibrahim’s son plans to return to Korçë when he has saved enough in Greece and when the economic conditions in Albania are more favourable. The eldest daughter also plans to return to Korçë, where she and her husband now have a spacious flat. Hence most of the family members will end up in Korçë: the parents as a result of a local-scale internal migration, the oldest daughter and the son via emigration to Athens. The younger daughter and her family, on the other hand, will not return; their future is set in the United States.

**Brief lessons from the Albanian evidence**

These three case-histories, although typical of many collected, do not represent the full spectrum of variation and linkages between different family members, different forms of migration (internal, international, temporary, permanent etc.) and different destinations. It also has to be acknowledged that these examples reflect the particular migration networks of southern Albania where, since 1990, there have been strong cross-border linkages to Greece. Compared to other parts of Albania, migration to the US is more important from southern Albania; some of this builds on much earlier migration links. On the other hand, movements to Italy and the UK are less prominent here than they are in Central and North Albania.

Nevertheless, much of what has been presented above in personalised and anecdotal fashion resonates with other studies on Albanian migration. Studies of Albanian migrants in Italy (King and Mai 2004) and in the UK (King et al. 2006) both reveal the importance of temporary migration to Greece as a ‘first step’ in order to finance further more ambitious migration journeys (Italy and beyond) as well as to lay the foundations for internal migration to Tirana or another major urban centre.
Probably the most detailed endorsement of our findings (though there are some different perspectives too) comes from Labrianidis and Kazazi (2006) who, based on a questionnaire survey of 324 returnees from Greece (239) and Italy (85), analysed the relationships between migration origin, return migration destination, and internal migration. These authors found that there was a marked trend for rural-origin migrants to settle in urban areas upon return, often after an interim spell in the origin village followed by a subsequent internal migration. However, they found little evidence of longer-distance internal redistribution: most returnees, whether they resettle in rural or urban destinations back home, did not shift outside of their home region. Two other insights from Labrianidis and Kazazi (2006) are noteworthy. First, the combination of internal migration and urban-oriented return migration is leading to over-rapid urban expansion with concomitant strain on services and infrastructures. Second, heavy emigration from southern Albania has created a vacuum which is in part filled by poor internal migrants from the North-East.

Albania’s contemporaneous mass emigration and internal migration over the short span of time since 1990 provides an excellent laboratory to study the interlinkages between the two types of movement. The statistical and mapping approach can yield a certain amount of insight, but only when case-histories are collected of individual migrants and their family contexts can we appreciate the full complexity at play. To use a recently-coined metaphor which we find very attractive, these migrants and their siblings, parents, children etc. engage in fragmented journeys (Collyer 2007) which can, on the one hand, owe much to chance (viz. Skënder’s failed attempt to land in Italy followed by his successful entry to Greece), but on the other hand form part of a patchwork of migratory episodes which together are often oriented to a family plan of reunification in some ‘better place’.

Conclusion
There is no doubt that the relationship between internal and international migration is a remarkably neglected topic within migration studies. This paper has tried to respond to the challenge of identifying their similarities and differences, and of creating linkages between the two types of migration. As we have seen, sometimes internal

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23 This may be because of the biased nature of the sample survey. Only 3 per cent of those questioned originated form the North of Albania, which statistically shows the highest rate of internal out-migration. Also the Labrianidis and Kazazi sample was overwhelmingly male; only 8 per cent of females were included (2006: 62-63).
movement may lead to international migration; in other cases the sequence may be reversed or other complex combinations may arise, particularly after return migration takes place. Sometimes internal migrants are a different subset of the total population than international migrants, wealth often being the discriminating factor. In other situations, internal and international mobility may be alternative and substitutable responses to the same set of conditions; the selection of internal versus international mobilities can be viewed as competing strategies in a matrix of opportunities open to potential migrants. Thus internal and international mobilities create an integrated system, which can be observed at a range of scales – family/household, community, national, and the constellation of countries linked by migration flows. To consider one form of migration without the other, as has so often happened in the past, is to look at only one part of the story, and results in a partial and unbalanced interpretation (Skeldon 2006: 28).

In conclusion we repeat what we said in the introduction (and many others have said it too): that any attempt to build a single overarching theory of migration for all types of migration, for all parts of the world, developed and less developed, and for all periods of time, is illusory. Such a quest risks ‘conceptual reductionism and theoretical imperialism’ (Pryor 1981: 128). On the other hand, it is not enough to rely on ‘empirical generalizations which, among other failings, tend to be ethnocentric and timebound’ (Zelinsky 1983: 19). Somewhere between these two epistemological extremes – an unattainable theoretical utopia and a myriad of empirical case-studies – some progress needs to be made at the level of what Castles (2007) and Portes (1997) have called middle-range theorisation in migration studies. We have suggested how this might come about with reference to internal and international migration, putting forward three possible areas for theoretical transfer or convergence: the application of a systems approach, originally derived from the study of internal migration, to international migration; the application of integration theory, traditionally applied to international migrants, to internal migrants; and the bringing together of internal and international migration in the debate on migration and development. A fourth, more methodological, integration was exemplified in our case-study of Albania, where we used maps and migration-path analysis to portray respectively the macro and micro interrelationships between internal and international movement. Following this example, we round off by encouraging other researchers to seek out datasets which enable international and internal migration to be studied conjointly (such as the UK
Census LS) and to mount their own surveys which will integrate the two migration traditions from the perspective of individuals, households and families, communities, regions and countries.
Table 1

Returned emigrants to three Greek Cities by pre-migration residential history (data are percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior residential history</th>
<th>Athens n=220</th>
<th>Thessaloniki n=216</th>
<th>Serres n=131</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First 15 years of life:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaloniki</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serres</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>60.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban places</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban places</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural places</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to emigration:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thessaloniki</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serres</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other urban places</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-urban places</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural places</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: urban places have more than 10,000 inhabitants, semi-urban have 2,000-9,999, and rural places less than 2,000.

Sources: Unger (1986: 142); survey data refer to 1980.
Table 2

Zelinsky’s model of mobility transition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE I – Premodern traditional society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Little genuine migration and limited circulation, linked to ‘traditional’ practices such as land use, commerce, religious observation etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE II – Early transitional society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• massive movement from countryside to cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• significant movement of rural population to colonisation frontiers within the country, if such areas exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• major emigration flows to available and attractive foreign destinations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• small, but significant, immigration of skilled workers and professionals from more advanced countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• significant growth in various kinds of circulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE III – Late transitional society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• continuing, but diminishing, movement from countryside to cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• lessening flow of migrants to colonisation frontiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• emigration fades out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• further increases in circulation, and in structural complexity of such moves</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASE IV – Advanced society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• movement from countryside to city continues to decline in absolute and relative terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• vigorous movement of migrants between cities and within urban agglomerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• settlement frontier stagnates or retreats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• significant net immigration of semi-skilled and unskilled workers from relatively underdeveloped countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• possible significant international migration or circulation of skilled and professional persons – direction and volume dependent on specific conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• vigorous accelerating circulation, particularly motivated by economic and pleasure oriented rationales</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PHASE V – Future super-advanced society

- better communication and delivery systems may lead to a decline in residential migration and in some forms of circulation
- most internal migration becomes inter- and intra-urban
- some further immigration of unskilled labour from less developed countries
- acceleration in some forms of circulation and inception of new forms
- strict political control of internal and international movements may be imposed

### Table 3

**Elements of theory building and fragmentation in the study of migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Five focal questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who are the migrants?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why are they migrating?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the spatial patterns of flows, origins and destinations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the consequences of migration on the societies of origin and destination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the associated political, policy and human rights issues?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of similarity and continuity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The temporal dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The spatial dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rural-urban nature of communities of origin and destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivations for migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature, density, strength and continuity of personal networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ties to current location – explaining non-migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The selectivity dimension</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of disciplinary fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migration as a social process – sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as a demographic process – demography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration costs and benefits; migration and economic growth and development – economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration as a spatial process; distance and human interaction – geography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioural approaches to migration – social psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and culture – anthropology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: after Pryor (1981)
References


Figure 1: Migration pathways
Figure 2: Albania population dynamics, 1989-2001
Figure 3. Albania migration dynamics, 1999-2001
Source: Carletto et al. (2004); Zezza et al. (2005)
Figure 4: Ledia and her family
Figure 5: Qemal & Nevrez and their family
Figure 6: Ibrahim and his family